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Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa one of the challenges that has remained elusive to 
policy-makers has been the issue of how to redistribute the same democratic advances made at 
national level to more ordinary citizens at grassroots level. The concern has been how to include 
voices of previously marginalized communities. The immediate policy plan at local government 
level is entitled “participatory governance” and has been adopted by the post-apartheid national 
government of the ANC to limit this participatory-democratic gap. The laws and policies that 
constitute the body of this policy are the White Paper on Local Government adopted in 1998 and 
the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. The 
Msunduzi municipality has formally adopted this policy and it is called “community 
participation policy”, which has yielded rather unsatisfactory results to date. Setting aside the 
issue of implementation for now, the present study explores the institutional design of this policy 
of participatory governance in Msunduzi by applying the design principles of the theory of 
“empowered participatory governance”. This theory attempts to understand how to build a deep 
democratic culture via government-community partnerships through the concept of citizens who 
are empowered to play such a role. The major finding of this thesis is that there are design flaws 
in these institutions in this municipality which require a reform of the policy itself. However, this 
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This thesis is concerned with the examination of the institutions of participatory governance in 
the Msunduzi municipality, namely, the ward committee system and the use of public meetings 
(hereafter izimbizo) with a particular focus on their design since their insertion into the operation 
of the municipality in 2005. The practical focus of this thesis is on the community participation 
policy of the municipality, with a deeper layout of what the aims of the municipality are, as well 
as how the municipality plans to put them into action.    
An adoption of the Msunduzi policy on community participation followed a number of national 
policy and legislative frameworks aimed at restructuring local governance institutions via the 
promulgation of the necessary legislation that sought to divide the provincial government and the 
municipalities into clearly separate spheres of government. This was something that was not 
clearly defined in the previous administration during the apartheid period.  
The White Paper on local government is the founding piece of legislation that spells out the need 
to restructure local government, with emphasis on the value of public engagement or partnership 
between the government and the people it governs. This is where the concept of “governance” 
rather than “government” originates. The term governance was carefully chosen, because it 
highlights the fact that government is no longer the only institution that governs people and that 
the people themselves need to become involved in their own governance. This thesis argues that 
this undertaking by government to involve their citizens in government is the necessary 
transformation that the government vitally needs to introduce into its institutions. However, a 
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theoretical discussion about such an undertaking by the government is a necessary input to 
understanding how such a relationship can be better handled. The need for this analysis lies in 
the fact that, historically, government is positioned in such a way that it imposes its superiority 
over the people who are governed, while the people constantly try to neutralize government 
power in order to have their own way.  
It should be acknowledged that an attempt to try and turn confrontation into an effective 
partnership is a very innovative task that needs further support. The need for theoretical input in 
such discussions is not small. It remains the cornerstone to the success of participatory 
institutions. This thesis has been divided into five chapters. 
The first chapter introduces the subsequent chapters. It consists of the literature study and broad 
analysis of the international, as well as regional, context in which the South African local 
government‟s restructuring takes place. It names factors that have necessitated this research into 
participatory governance in the Msunduzi municipality.  
Chapter Two examines the lack of a democratic culture in the former institutions of Msunduzi 
municipality. This chapter, states that the absence of democratic culture in the preceding 
institutions of Msunduzi municipality could be reasons why participatory institutions have failed 
in the municipality.  
Chapter Three discusses the imminent problems in relation to ward committees, as outlined in 
the policy document. It delves into an analysis of this participatory framework to see how it can 
be improved using the Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) model.   
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Chapter Four analyzes the problems of design of the izimbizo system, as is laid out in the policy 
document for community participation. The aim of this chapter is to offer some solutions to the 
stated problems using the EPG model.  
The final chapter is basically a synopsis of the chapters Two to Four, summarizing the findings 
and recommendations. Discussed will be the implications of the results and the questions that 
inevitably arise from them; what shape future research might have to take as a result of this 
study; and how relevant these results are to the greater challenge of creating successful 
government-community partnerships in South Africa at local levels. 
It needs to be pointed out that the analysis made in this study has a few shortcomings. First of 
these is the fact that, although due effort is made to analyze the design features of the policy 
document which sets the blueprint for participatory institutions to be put in place, the study does 
not provide a full investigation and analysis of the practical implementation of these policies. 
Again, therefore, there might be even more problems with these institutions caused by 
ineffective administration and supervision. The strength of this study is the fact that this 
maladministration can be linked to a flawed policy, making this analysis very important in 
creating a foundation in the form of a clear and uniform policy towards participation so that the 
practical implementation of it may be measured against such a policy. In other words, there is no 
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The apparent failure of contemporary government institutions to instill a deep and far-reaching 
culture of accountability has led to worldwide concerns over how to practically implant this 
democratic ideal and consequently calls for the expansion or widening of representative 
institutions to address this problem. South African local government has failed to yield to a 
greater culture of democratic accountability, with reported cases in the media of leaders who 
engage in practices that make people doubt whether the institution of democracy exists at all. 
One cannot deny that phenomena of corruption, abuse of state resources, coupled with a 
perceived low rate of transformation and an ineffective system of service delivery, help 
undermine the core values upon which our new institutions of democracy rest. There can be no 
doubt that if the government intends to resolve these problems it will have to introduce a number 
of changes and improve its existing institutions of public participation.  
The liberal-participatory democracy gap 
Representative democracy as a system of organizing society has come under sharp criticism. 
Fung and Wright (2003: 03) state that the representative form of political organization is 
“ineffective in accomplishing the central ideals of democratic politics: namely that of facilitating 
an active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, 
devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy 
society.” Evidence exists worldwide that there is general concern about the efficacy and the 
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ability of democratic institutions, in their present form, to yield a greater level of accountability. 
The rate at which people, worldwide, have chosen to engage in violence to resolve disputes due 
to irresponsible governance proves this point. For example the actual cause of violence in 
Nigeria regarding the sharing of oil can be traced back to the undemocratic demarcation of the 
land which had made the distribution of resources unpopular (Mead, 1996); this was ultimately 
the failure of that government to democratize the processes of resource distribution by inviting 
the views of the people affected. Almost the same thing can be said about Zimbabwe‟s land 
crisis, where it is clear that their government‟s failure to include its citizens in its pursuit to bring 
about a fair redistribution of land amongst its citizens has cost the government much more than it 
could afford. Again the recent xenophobic violent attacks on foreigners in Alexandra, Durban 
and Pietermaritzburg can be linked to a lack of implementation of sound democratic practices 
and principles at local level, even though some may deny this association (Karrim, 2008).  
The simple fact is that local governments have a great responsibility to ensure that a democratic 
forum exists, where people who live with each other can express their concerns freely and raise 
whatever issues they may have. This is an even greater need in SA, as there is no easy access to 
politicians at provincial and national level. The creation of a forum can be ensured by 
empowering the people by allowing them access to information. The only way to insure that 
information is accessible to the people is by first building institutions that both allow and 
encourage people to participate in governance. With this kind of access to information, people 
will have the opportunity to improve their political faculties and considerably improve the 
quality of their contributions. That true democracy begins at the local level simply cannot be 




The importance of participatory democracy 
The changes being brought about by various local governments should indicate to all other 
governments that the strengthening of democratic institutions cannot be ignored any longer and 
is essential to their functioning. The need for empowering of local governance structures through 
public participation is a widespread consensus of many organizations, including the World Bank 
and many donor organizations. The validity of this consensus cannot be denied any longer. The 
strengthening of democratic institutions should begin at the local level through the restructuring 
of institutions dealing with citizen participation, to ensure that democratic practices, as well as 
the benefits of democracy, are shared by all.  
It is rare that problems of instability are linked to the nature of local governance institutions, let 
alone to the lack of citizen participation. Many serious scholars in political science and other 
disciplines from the Third World countries often try to understand the origins of their problems, 
as well as those of poor people in the communities, by pointing at global circumstances brought 
about by neo-liberal structures. The common result of this is an attempt to shift the agenda 
beyond the responsibility of the state or that of local municipalities. Whilst the challenges of 
global development and its effects cannot be ignored or put aside, the importance of, and the 
level of, the contribution that ordinary citizens make to the stability of a state needs to be 
emphasized, as this is the core element of a stable society.  The involvement and participation of 
ordinary citizens in the structures of governance goes far beyond the concept of free, fair and 
regular elections. It requires the creation of a democratic space, through the reformation of state 
institutions and a greater involvement on the part of all citizens in the decision-making processes 
regarding matters which affect their lives. 
12 
 
In this thesis the importance of participatory democracy is stressed by emphasizing the fact that 
those „smaller‟ issues, such as the failure of municipalities to deliver services, or the failure of 
policy-makers to equip local levels of governance with the necessary infrastructure or powers, 
may be the root causes of „bigger‟ problems. It is not the assumption of the present study that 
there is such a thing as a perfect model of democracy. The intellectual landscape with regard to 
the perfect way to govern society remains as diverse and as contradictory as ever. Unfortunately 
there is no perfect model which can be referred to for a resolution of this problem. This point is 
made in relation to the ideas of democracy which have been shaped, refined and contested over 
time to question its nature, origins, extent, practice and benefits.  
The legacy of the democratic debate 
The idea of democracy and its consequent institutions has long remained a source of critical 
debate by the global community. In the early usage of the term, the debate often rested on the 
meaning of democracy. Rousseau conceived democracy as consensus by the citizens of a state in 
issues that affect them. (Rousseau, 1949: 25). The presence of a “general will” in his ideal 
society is a manifestation of this classical theory. Rousseau (1949: 28) stresses that “the idea of 
representation is modern; it comes from the feudal government”. Rousseau continues “In ancient 
republics, and even in monarchies, the people never had representatives; the word itself was 
unknown”. Conversely, Joseph Schumpeter (1949: 269) promoted the idea that democracy was 
simply about choosing a government leader through the election process. This idea of 
democracy, being simply about elections, has been questioned and eventually gave rise to a 
complementary model of participatory democracy. Pieterse (2000: 07) in relation to the 
development of the participatory discourse, stated: 
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The participative discourse tended to divide between two broad groups: those who saw it 
as a useful process to legitimate state actions and forge compliance, and the alternative 
and more radical version focused on civil society empowerment and state 
democratization as the primary functions of participation. A broad-based consensus 
emerged that democratic decentralization will produce effective local government that is 
responsive to the needs of the poor and can provide opportunities for participation around 
issues that matter most in people‟s lives. 
Whichever way the discourse of participatory democracy is perceived, however, the dividends 
which it aims to yield are as old as the notion of the social contract. The ideas that have given 
shape to it can be traced back to the time of early European civilization. The policy of 
participatory governance in South Africa is an extension of this idea of participatory democracy.  
The idea of democracy as simply an alternative system of governance radically changed 
following rapid economic growth in Europe, along with the growth of then policy of 
expansionism/ imperialism; and the eventual division of the world into two major blocks, the 
Western capitalist and the Eastern communist bloc. Critics of democracy have argued that the 
spread of Western democracy to other parts of the world followed a triumph of Western 
capitalism, with its neo-liberal ideology, over the Eastern communist bloc, which collapsed in 
the 20
th
 century. Ultimately the idea of democracy has become a moral value that all the nations 
of the world need to adopt willingly. Failure to comply would necessitate the use of force to 
ensure the adoption of democracy. It is important to stress that the stance of democracy taken in 
this thesis is shaped by many events which have occurred around the world and so some 
criticism is valid. Some critics have asked which standards should be used to measure what 
constitutes democracy, because different nations have different definitions of democracy.  
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An analysis of democracy goes hand in hand with an analysis of citizenship. An analysis of 
citizenship is crucial to the understanding of the motivation behind various institutional designs 
of governance. The idea of citizenship in the African context has been shaped almost exclusively 
by the development agenda, although other factors relevant to this cannot be ignored. These 
include the need to free the African continent from all forms of neocolonialism, for example. 
Africa‟s obsession with a development agenda has often been pursued, at the expense of 
democracy. Perhaps the recent spate of violence in land reforms in Zimbabwe is an effective 
example of how a government can ignore some human rights in favour of others. Such a move 
has proven disastrous for the growth of democracy. One may conclude that the example of 
Zimbabwe and its land reform situation is evidence of a situation where the state has given an 
ontological definition of citizenship as a total commitment to the state; the end results thereof 
could only lead to abandonment of individual rights. Any sanction of individual rights could lead 
to a further sanction of political rights and vice versa. However, with the growth of Western 
ideas of democracy in Africa the ideas of citizenship have shifted towards the acknowledgement 
and advantage of individual rights and political rights. This has meant that the state now has to 
be accountable to the citizens and not only the other way round.  There is a slow decentralization 
of state institutions and a de-concentration of state power, as well as a growth in citizen 






The South African challenge 
In South Africa, with the demise of the apartheid regime and the settling in of the new 
government committed to democracy, changes will take place towards a culture of respect for 
individual and political rights. Efforts to renew state institutions have already taken place, 
beginning with the drafting of the relevant legislation. Under the new legislation, the government 
sought to invite the majority of people previously marginalized and ravaged by conflicts using 
the democratic ship of institutional design. With the institutions previously centralized, it was 
clear that institutions had to be decentralized and made accessible to the ordinary citizens of the 
country. Again, functions that previously were a prerogative of the central government have now 
become detached to the wider local management offices of the communities. However, the 
debate continues concerning the extent of the devolution of power.  
Municipalities have accepted the ideas of institutional renewal and of making state institutions 
more accessible. The Msunduzi government is one such municipality that has committed itself to 
making institutions of governance more accessible to the wider community.  The policy of 
community participation adopted by the Msunduzi municipality outlines the new objectives of 
the municipality and the set of institutions it plans to put in place in order to promote 
participatory democracy. Izimbizo and ward committee systems are two main means to drive 
community participation within the activities the municipality has to deal with. This set of 
participatory institutions is provided for within the constitutional legislative and policy 
frameworks. The present work examines the design of these institutions, as laid out in the policy 




Government adopts a more formal policy of participatory governance 
The South African constitution makes it clear that the foremost goals and purposes of the new 
governance is not only to localize governance institutions, but, also to widen popular 
participation of ordinary citizens in the institutions of governance, and, to deepen democracy by 
promoting the social and economic development of previously marginalized groups. All this 
information is contained in Chapter Seven, section 152, sub-section 1 of the South African 
constitution.  This is further dealt with in Chapter Six of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, 
which grants communities the legal right to information, consultation and participation on local 
governmental matters and gives municipalities responsibilities in relation to participation 
(MCPP, 2005: 01). One should be warned about the fact that the idea of a more democratic 
governance in South Africa is not at all a product of a democratic-centred government, but, as 
Steven Friedman notes, “it is rooted in the „people‟s power‟ style of oppositional politics to 
apartheid of the 1980s (Piper and Nadvi, 2007: 14).”  
That participatory governance is understood as deepening democracy in the legislation is evident 
(Barichievy et al., 2005: 376). There are three substantive aspects to the innovation of 
„participatory governance‟: the definition of the municipality, ward committees and requirements 
for public participation (Barichievy et al., 2005: 374). The Municipal Systems Act defines the 
municipality as consisting of the governing structures (the elected councillors), the 
administration (the appointed staff) and the residents. The inclusion of residents as a part of the 
municipality is claimed as being unique in the world and establishes the grounds for greater 
public involvement in municipal affairs (Barichievy et al., 2005: 374). The second innovation, as 
outlined in the Municipal Systems Act, is the institution of ward committees for category A and 
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B municipalities only. Although not compulsory, the new system provides for committees to be 
established in each ward of a municipality (Barichievy et al., 2005: 375). The third and final 
innovation is really a set of requirements for public involvement in various decision-making 
processes (Barichievy at al., 2005: 375). Especially important here are the imperatives to public 
consultation concerning the annual budget and all by-laws, innovations which bring community 
participation to the foundational activities of local governance (Barichievy et al., 2005: 375). 
These later innovations push public participation further into the heart of local decision-making, 
rather than at provincial or national level.  
The Msunduzi case and the challenges of institutionalizing participatory governance  
The Msunduzi Municipality community participation policy document  (hereafter called the 
policy document) states that their objective is “To establish a community participation approach 
system that would lead to the self-mobilization of communities whereby they will be facilitated 
to participate in joint analyses with council and all relevant stakeholders to improve their living 
and working conditions.” (MMCPP, 2005: 03). However, recent research has shown that practice 
of participatory governance in the Msunduzi Municipality has been ineffective in deepening 
democracy (Barichievy et al., 2005: 380). Piper and Nadvi (2007: 21) have shown that only 50% 
of ward committees met regularly and, even amongst those, frequency varied widely. In addition, 
the speaker reported that 40% of the ward committees were non-functional (Piper and Nadvi, 
2007: 21). Conversely, just eight (roughly 25%) are described as „very functional‟ (Piper and 
Nadvi, 2007: 21).  
Fung and Wright suspect that perhaps the recent attack on the role of the “affirmative state” and 
“the erosion of the democratic vitality” is a result of poor design of institutions, rather than with 
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the tasks they face (Fung and Wright, 2003: 04). Barichievy et al. (2005: 380) suspects that 
institutional design flaws in the Msunduzi Municipality, shown partly in the centralization of 
decision-making in the Municipal Council, as well as party politicization of ward committees, 
are the reasons for the failure of participatory institutions in Msunduzi. The present author will 
look at the question of institutional design in the municipality. Is it true that these institutions are 
poorly designed? How should we arrive at this conclusion? If true, what is the missing 
ingredient? Or perhaps how do they need to be designed in order for them to meet international 
best practices? These are the central questions needing to be addressed. 
The legacy of apartheid 
South Africa‟s local government move to promote a more participatory system succeeded a more 
centralized, exclusive local government, typical of the apartheid era. To democratize local 
government was one of the major challenges faced by the South African government after the 
demise of apartheid. Barichievy et al. (2005: 373) states that the initial step was achieved mostly 
through making local government a system of representative government, similar to the national 
and provincial levels, with regular elections every five years. With the introduction of 
“participatory governance structures”, the aim was to make local government more democratic, 
by inviting ordinary citizens into the decision-making processes. Participatory governance refers 
to a set of structural and procedural requirements to realize what the Municipal Systems Act (32 
of 2000) terms „community participation‟ in the operation of local government (Piper and 
Deacon, 2006: 03). 
The Msunduzi Municipality uses izimbizo, as well as ward committees, as the institutional 
reform required to decentralize decision-making to ordinary citizens.  However, the question 
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remains whether or not decentralization is equal to democratization? Decentralization means 
transferring fiscal, political and administrative functions from higher to lower levels of 
government (Wescott and Porter, 2005: 02). Decentralization is employed for different reasons 
including the expansion of democratic models of governance, or efficiency gains such as 
economic efficiency or revenue efficiency (Wescott and Porter, 2005: 02).  Decentralization does 
not necessarily mean democratization. Arnstein (2004: 01) stresses that “citizen participation is 
citizen power.” Perhaps the point about democratization is that it is achievable with some degree 
of citizen power, which consists of citizen control, delegated power and partnership (Arnstein, 
2004: 03).  Has the Msunduzi Municipality decentralized these ingredients of citizen power in its 
engagement with its community through ward committees and izimbizo? 
A theoretical debate around the restructuring of municipalities  
There are various ways of looking at transformation in institutions of governance. The World 
Bank participation team contrasts “participatory stance” in the democratization project with the 
“external expert stance”. The external expert stance means that the project sponsors and 
designers place themselves outside the local system they are investigating and about which they 
are making decisions – even if they happen to come from or live within the local system 
(Participation Learning Group, 1996: 04). The “participatory stance” allows for three ingredients 
that make participatory stance more desirable. These are “social learning”, “social invention” and 
“commitment”. It has been reasoned that the participatory stance often allows for social learning, 
which is the kind of practice that is essential in order to enable social change (Participation 
Learning Group, 1996: 05). Social learning is followed by “social invention”.  Social invention 
occurs when “The stakeholders invent the new practices and institutional arrangements they are 
willing to adopt in order to effect the change they want” (Participation Learning Group, 1996: 
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05). When stakeholders have designed the project themselves a high level of “commitment” is 
generated, something unlikely to occur using an expert stance (Participation Learning Group, 
1996: 06).  
Participatory Model: Empowered Participatory Governance 
The strength of the “participatory stance” is that it embraces a “bottom-up” approach, by 
involving the poor and learning from them about their needs and priorities (Participation 
Learning Group, 1996: 09). It is believed that only “local institutions can better discern local 
needs and aspirations and are therefore more likely to respond to them adequately” (Chinsinga, 
2005: 530). Participation at grassroots level is believed to make development plans and 
interventions more relevant, give people better self-esteem and help to legitimize the 
development planning process. It also gives people the opportunity to influence the resource 
allocation processes which has a direct bearing on their livelihoods (Chinsinga, 2005: 530). In 
other words, it is through democratic decentralization that communities can effectively realize 
their full potential to live dignified and fulfilling lives. 
How do we achieve democratization in an environment where there is a “lack of resources, 
material, human capital and skills, and where marginalized populations and even the 
incompetence of local electorates in newly democratized local governments seem set to 
undermine whatever progress may be forthcoming” (Dauda, 2006: 291)? These are all barriers to 
local governments becoming effective and accountable and, thus, legitimate (Dauda, 2006: 291). 
Surprisingly enough, a lack of resources can be an advantage in terms of providing the impetus 
for local governments to engage local people (Dauda, 2006: 292). Dauda (2006: 291) states that, 
despite the emphasis on democracy in the current round of decentralization, available literature 
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does not seem to recognize the potential for democratic accountability at the local level in sub-
Saharan Africa. Barichievy et al., referring to the system of ward committees in Msunduzi, says 
that, although ward committees are presented as part of „participatory governance‟, they are in 
fact better understood as deepening the representative aspect of municipal governance and that 
their participatory dividend is limited. (Barichievy et al., 2005: 377). Why do the local 
government participatory institutions in Msunduzi Municipality yield less than satisfactory 
results? How should these institutions be framed in order for them to awaken an effective citizen 
participation that yields greater decision-making and consequently improved political 
capabilities for ordinary citizens? The present study will show that for participatory government 
to achieve what Chinsinga calls “the trinity of good governance, development and poverty 
reduction” (Chinsinga, 2005: 530), state institutions will have to be ceded to the local people in a 
far greater degree than before. 
Empowered Participatory Governance 
The present research will employ the Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) model by 
Fung and Wright. The EPG model is a radical form of participatory governance, in the sense that 
its central ideal is to see ordinary people in local government using their capacities, empowered 
with the set of skills, instruments and with enough power to make sensible decisions through 
reasoned deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2003: 05).  Its proposed effect on state institutions is to 
ensure a total transformation of them to ones that incorporate ordinary citizens in the decision-
making processes. To use Arnstein‟s language, the citizens enter into partnership with state, 
officials rather than the officials dominating the whole process. (Arnstein, 2004: 03).  
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The EPG model is formulated using four participatory experiments. The system of 
neighbourhood governance councils in Chicago is one of the four experiments. The 
neighbourhood governance councils in Chicago address the fears and hopes of inner-city 
Chicago residents by turning urban bureaucracy on its head and developing substantial power 
over policing and public schools (Fung and Wright, 2003: 07). The new participatory public 
schools system in Chicago was established by law after great upheavals from the community, 
which complained that schools in this district failed to educate the city‟s children (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 07). Born out of this protest was the reform of the public schools, which shifted 
power from a centralized city-wide headquarters to the individual schools themselves (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 07). The law established Local Schools Councils, which are composed of six 
parents, two community members, two teachers and the principal of the school. Its members 
(other than the principal) are elected every two years (Fung and Wright, 2003: 07). The councils 
of high schools add to these eleven members one non-voting student representative. (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 07). These councils are empowered, and required by law, to select principals, 
write principal performance contracts that they monitor and review every three years, develop 
annual School Improvement Plans that address staff, programme, and infrastructure issues, 
monitor the implementation of those plans and approve schools budgets (Fung and Wright, 2003: 
07). The Chicago Police Department restructured itself in the mid 1990s along the deeply 
decentralized and democratic lines that resemble (but were conceived and implemented quite 
independently from) that city‟s school reform (Fung and Wight, 2003: 08). This reform was in 
response to the perception that conventional policing practices had proved largely ineffective in 
stemming the rise of crime, or in maintaining safety, in Chicago neighbourhoods (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 08). Out of this came new community policing “beats” that became administrative 
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atoms of policing (Fung and Wright, 2003: 08). It is said that interested residents and police 
officers serving the area attend “community beat meetings”, held monthly in each beat (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 08). In the “beat” meetings, residents and police discuss the neighbourhood‟s 
public safety problems in order to establish, through deliberation, which problems should be 
counted as priorities that merit the concentrated attention of police and residents (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 08).          
Habitat Conservation Planning, under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, is another participatory 
experiment from which the EPG is drawn. Section 9 of that Act prohibits the “taking” – killing 
or injuring – of any wildlife listed as an endangered species through either direct means or 
indirect action such as modification of its habitat (Fung and Wright, 2003: 09). An “incidental 
take permit” was adopted to escape the impediments of the Endangered Species Act.  Under this 
new process, applicants needed to produce a Habitat Conservation Plan that allows human 
activity in the habitat of an Endangered Species, so long as “take” occurs only incidentally (Fung 
and Wright, 2003: 09). The plan includes measures to mitigate take, and human activity does not 
impair the species survival and (Fung and Wright, 2003: 09). Under the new process, developers, 
environmentalists and other stakeholders could potentially work together to construct large-scale 
habitat conservation plans (Fung and Wright, 2003: 09). Through deliberative processes, these 
stakeholders have developed sophisticated management plans that set out explicit numerical 
goals, measures to achieve those goals, monitoring regimes that assess plan effectiveness through 
time and adaptive management provisions to incorporate new scientific information and respond 
to unforeseen events (Fung and Wright, 2003: 09).  
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The EPG is also drawn from the participatory budgeting of Porto Alegre in Brazil. This system 
was developed by the Workers Party in 1988 to try to transform clientelistic, vote-for-money 
budgeting arrangements into a publicly accountable, bottom-up and deliberative system driven 
by expressed needs of city residents (Fung and Wright, 2003: 11).  In each region of the sixteen 
that compose the city, a Plenary Assembly meets twice a year to settle budgetary issues. City 
executives, administrators, representatives of community entities such as neighbourhood 
associations, youth and health clubs, and any interested inhabitant of the city attends these 
assemblies, but only residents of the region can vote in them. These Plenary Assemblies are 
jointly co-ordinated by members of municipal government and community delegates. At the first 
of these annual plenary meetings, held in March, a report reviewing and discussing the 
implementation of the prior year‟s budget is presented by representatives of the city government 
(Fung and Wright, 2003: 11). Delegates are also elected from those attending the assembly to 
participate in meetings conducted over the following three months, to work out the region‟s 
spending priorities. At the end of three months, these delegates report back to the second 
regional plenary assembly with a set of regional budget proposals (Fung and Wright, 2003: 11). 
At this second plenary meeting, proposals are ratified and two delegates and substitutes are 
elected to represent the region in a city-wide body called the Participatory Budgeting Council, 
which meets over the following five months to formulate a city –wide budget from these regional 
agendas (Fung and Wright, 2003: 11). The city-level budget council is composed of two elected 
delegates from each of the regional assemblies, two elected delegates from each of five 
“thematic plenaries” representing the city as a whole, a delegate from the Municipal Workers‟ 
Union, one from the union of neighbourhood associations and two delegates from central 
municipal agencies (Fung and Wright, 2003: 11). The group meets intensively, at least once per 
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week, from July to September, to discuss and establish a municipal budget that conforms to 
priorities established at the regional level, while still co-ordinating spending for the city as a 
whole.    
The last participatory experiment from which an EPG model is drawn is the Panchayat 
democracy in West Bengal and Kerala in India. These reforms were introduced in response to a 
high level of corruption that dominated these districts (Fung and Wright, 2003: 12). Three 
changes were particularly important in West Bengal. First, these reforms increased the financing 
capacity of the lowest-level Panchayat authorities – the Gram Panchayats –by imposing a 
revenue sharing scheme with the districts and giving the Gram Panchayats their own taxing 
power (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). Second, these measures stipulated that one-third of seats in 
Panchayat assemblies and leadership positions would be occupied by women and that lower-
caste –Scheduled case and Scheduled tribe – would occupy leadership positions in all of these 
bodies in proportion to their population in the districts (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). Finally, the 
1993 reforms established two kinds of directly deliberative bodies, called Gram Sabha, to 
increase the popular accountability of Gram Panchayat representatives (Fung and Wright, 2003: 
13). The Gram Sabha consists of all the persons within a Gram Panchayat area and meets once a 
year in the month of December (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). At this meeting, elected Gram 
Panchayat representatives review the accomplishment (or lack thereof) of the previous year‟s 
budget and action items (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). Similar participatory reforms were 
introduced in Kerala, drawn from those in West Bengal. Under the programmme, some 40 
percent of the state‟s public budget would be taken from traditionally powerful line departments 
in the bureaucracy and devolved to some nine hundred individual Panchayat village planning 
councils (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). In order to spend these monies, however, each village was 
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required to produce a detailed development plan that specified assessments of need, development 
reports, specific projects, supplemental financing, arrangements for deciding and documenting 
plan beneficiaries and monitoring arrangements (Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). Subsequently, 
these plans, in principle, are approved or rejected by direct vote in popular village assemblies 
(Fung and Wright, 2003: 13). 
Fung and Wright draw from these experiments‟ common features, which they effectively refer to 
as an EPG. Fung and Wright (2003: 03) point out that “though these four reforms differ 
dramatically in the details of their design, issue areas, and scope, they all aspire to deepen ways 
in which ordinary people affect their lives.” These institutional reforms vary widely in many 
dimensions and none perfectly realizes the democratic values of citizen participation, 
deliberation and empowerment (Fung and Wright, 2003: 06). These experiments are 
participatory because they rely on the commitment and capacities of ordinary people to make 
sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation and empowered because they attempt to tie 
action to discussion (Fung and Wright, 2003: 05). What can be said of this model is that it is a 
broadly applicable model of deliberative democratic practice that can be expanded both 
horizontally – into other policy areas and other regions – and vertically into higher and lower 
levels of institutional and social life (Fung and Wright, 2003: 15). The EPG takes many of its 
normative commitments from analyses of practices and values of communication, public 
justification and deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2003: 15). It is part of a broader collaboration to 
discover and imagine democratic institutions that are at once more participatory and effective 
than the familiar configuration of political representation and bureaucratic administration (Fung 
and Wright, 2003: 15).  
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Fung and Wright have drawn this model, which consists of the three key principles and the three 
institutional design properties of the model.  The first of the three guiding principles in this EPG 
model is that the experiments must have clear practical orientation; secondly they need to 
constitute something of bottom-up participation; and thirdly the experiments must constitute 
deliberative development of solutions to community problems (Fung and Wright, 2003: 15).  
These are the principles that are drawn from, or found in the experiments discussed above. The 
principle of practical orientation requires that participatory groups gear themselves towards 
solving real practical problems such as providing public safety (Fung and Wright, 2003: 16). 
Bottom-up participation refers to the situation where people directly affected by “targeted 
problems” apply their knowledge, intelligence and interest to the formulation of solutions (Fung 
and Wright, 2003: 16). Deliberative solution generation refers to a decision-making mechanism 
in which “participants listen to each other‟s positions and generate group choices after due 
consideration” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 17). 
The three institutional design features include the devolution of public decision authority to 
empowered local units; and secondly the creation of formal linkages of responsibility, otherwise 
referred to as centralized supervision and co-ordination; and the third design feature of the 
experiments is that they are state-centred and not voluntaristic (Fung and Wright, 2003: 16). 
Devolution design property refers to reforms to participatory bodies that are “creatures of a 
transformed state endowed with substantial public authority” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 16). 
Centralized supervision and coordination design property requires local participatory bodies to 
be connected to superordinate bodies (Fung and Wright, 2003: 21). The last of these design 
properties is that these participatory bodies should be state centred and not voluntaristic. This 
requires colonization of state power and transformation of formal governance institutions (Fung 
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and Wright, 2003: 22). Fung and Wright admit only one shortcoming in relation to these 
institutional design features, that they offer them as only observations and hypotheses that 
contribute to institutions that advance, stabilize and deepen democratic values and not that they 
are necessary (Fung and Wright, 2003: 20). Fung and Wright, in framing their model, take into 
account background conditions that are necessary for the institutional designs to contribute to the 
realization of democratic values. The present author uses this as well, in analyzing the Msunduzi 
policy document. The full exploration of these principles and institutional design features, and of 
how they can help advance participatory democracy in Msunduzi, will be given with an 
examination of the Msunduzi community participation policy to determine the lengths to which 
Msunduzi‟s participatory institutions go in meeting the criterion explained in the EPG model.   
The gradualist model 
The EPG model theory differs by considerable margins to the model offered by Krantz, who 
offers a “gradualist model” of participatory governance. According to this argument, the EPG 
reforms can be viewed as part of a larger trend toward participatory democratic innovation. If 
this is correct, according to Krantz (2003: 6), then the gradual or partial reforms are similar and 
related in important ways to the more radical EPG reforms. Rather than viewing the EPG reform 
as a fait accompli, a one-time intervention in the institutional design, this perspective emphasizes 
the cycle of reinforcement and further reform that allows for the longevity of the system (Krantz, 
2003: 06). However, this “gradualist model” is packed with a number of distortions that make it 
even less perfect as a standard model for the pursuit of democracy. The first of these is that it 
leaves too much room for experts or officials to decide what needs to be done, when, in fact, the 
democratic demand now is more about achieving a total transformation of institutions whereby 
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citizens have control over the institutions. As Krantz puts it herself, “The democratic effect of 
this process facilitation is impeded, however, when the same city staff also acts as „experts‟ who 
„educate‟ citizens on matters of context under debate” (Krantz, 2003: 06).  If a participatory 
process educates people about decision-making, without allowing them to question the process 
or the norms of bureaucratic and expert disciplines that constrain decisions, the process is less 
than fully deliberative and the net effect on civil society could be one of co-optation rather than 
empowerment (Krantz, 2003: 06).  
The expert model 
The EPG model is also a move against the erstwhile model characterized by less democratic 
practices, as it relies on expert knowledge in its decision-making processes - the expert stance. In 
this approach it is only the experts who are given the leverage on decision-making. In this model 
ordinary citizens remain the subjects to be analyzed, diagnosed and treated according to the 
experts‟ preferences. In the expert stance, the designers place themselves outside the local 
system they are investigating and about which they are making decisions, even if they happen to 
come from, or live within, the local system (Participation Learning Group, 1996: 04). This model 
falls short of the necessary aims required to make any fair assessments of the design of 







Fundamental research questions for the exploration of the Msunduzi community 
participation policy 
The major research objective of this thesis is finding an answer to the question: 
How should the Msunduzi policy, more specifically its “participatory institutions”, be framed in 
order for them to awaken effective citizen participation that yields greater decision-making and 
consequently improved political capabilities for ordinary citizens? 
Specific key questions using those provided by the EPG model, outlined below, are:  
 
1. Do izimbizo and the ward committees address a specific area of practical public concern? 
2. Does decision-making in izimbizo and in ward committees rely upon the empowered 
involvement of ordinary citizens and officials in the field? 
3. Do izimbizo and ward committees attempt to solve those problems through processes of 
reasoned deliberation? 
 
In terms of their institutional properties, 
 
4. Do these experiments devolve decision and implementation power to local action units? 
5. Are local action units not autonomous, but rather recombinant and linked to each other 
and to supervening levels of the state in order to allocate resources, solve common and 
cross-border problems and diffuse innovations and learning? 
6. Do the experiments colonize and transform existing state institutions? Are the 
administrative bureaucracies charged with solving these problems restructured into 
deliberative groups?  
7. Do these groups have the power to implement the outcomes of their deliberations; or do 
they rely on the endorsement and subsequent processes of state bodies to practically 




The Methodology and Methods: Discourse Analysis: 
The present author will investigate the discourse of citizen/community participation as found in 
the Msunduzi community participation policy. Questions relevant for discourse analysis include 
the meaning of citizen/community participation in the Msunduzi policy document; the effect this 
meaning has on the kind of institutional designs envisaged for community participation, namely 
ward committees and izimbizo. The methodology used is that of discourse analysis. Discourse is 
simply defined as “a system of statements which constructs an object” (Parker, 1992: 05). 
Citizen participation and institutional design are a few examples of various discourses found in 
the policy document of Msunduzi‟s community participation policy. The method of discourse 
analysis is very useful for the present study, because it elucidates a variety of issues that give rise 
to problems that this project is concerned about. For example, the Msunduzi municipality state, 
in its community participation policy, that one of its reasons for believing in community 
participation is that it leads to effective decision-making. Through the method of discourse 
analysis we question this; what is really meant by effective-decision making in the Msunduzi 
policy document? Does it mean that more power is going to be given to the citizens? Or does it 
mean that by inviting citizens sometimes to participate in decision-making processes of the 
municipal council this will legitimize their projects and lead to less toyi-toying (open 
confrontation) against the municipal councils‟ unfavourable decisions?  
In the Msunduzi policy document community participation is defined “as a direct or indirect 
involvement and education of people, through democratically elected representatives in all 
projects that affect their daily lives.” Of course this raises a number of questions. For example, 
what exactly is meant by “indirect involvement” or “education of people” in this definition? Can 
participation only be conducted through democratically elected representatives? And how would 
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this impact on the power-relations between citizens and the government officials facilitating 
these community participation workshops? When we analyze these words we can conclusively 
deduce from them that the government sees its officials as experts who should help in educating 
the people and take decisions on their behalf because they may not be capable of doing this 
themselves.  If this is the case, then we can  again draw from this to say that Msunduzi‟s 
understanding of effective citizen participation does not bear any reference to the empowerment 
of ordinary people, but is rather seen as a way of legitimizing their policies. The only method 
that can assist us in determining this is through discourse analysis.  
The author’s assumptions 
It is clear to the present author that the problem in the Msunduzi municipality with regard to 
community participation is not only at one level of the institution, but at both higher and lower 
levels, as well as at the policy and the practice levels of the whole policy framework. I believe 
that citizen participation involves much more than inviting people for the purpose of educating 
them about projects that affect their lives, or as an exercise that merely serves to legitimize 
government policies.  The concept of citizen participation should go beyond that. Citizen 
participation should be regarded as an important process, even if the people for whom it is 
organized do not have much to say about how things should be done. It should be seen as an end 
in itself rather than as a means to an end.  The EPG will help organize all my ideas about what 
citizen participation should mean and how institutions should be organised. This theory sets a 
very high standard on what institutions of participatory governance should be like and what 
should be taken into consideration when setting up institutions for this purpose. The EPG theory 
advocates a more democratic set of participatory institutions. According to Fung and Wright, 
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EPG has a “colonizing effect” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 27) on state institutions. A total 
transformation of state institutions is envisaged by the EPG model.  
Using the methodology of discourse analysis, in this thesis I will be concerned primarily about 
two sets of participatory institutions in Msunduzi namely izimbizo and ward committees. I will 
apply the analytic rubrics supplied by the EPG model. I will determine whether or not the 
institutions of izimbizo and ward committees contain in their deliberations, and as part of their 
institutional practices, any of the following elements: 1) pragmatic orientation; 2) deliberative 
solution generation; 3) bottom-up participation; 4) devolution of powers; 5) recombinant by 
nature; 6) are state centred, not voluntary; 7) whether or not all participants have roughly an 












Proximate research questions and methods 
Research questions Research tasks Methods 
1. Do izimbizo and the ward committees address a 
specific area of practical public concern? 
Examine principles of 
EPG in relation to the 
policy document 
*Theoretical analysis 
*Document analysis  
*Report analysis 
*Legislative analysis 
2. Does decision-making in izimbizo and in ward 
committees rely upon the empowered involvement of 
ordinary citizens and officials in the field? 
Examine principles of 
EPG in relation to the 
policy document 
*Theoretical analysis 
*Document analysis  
*Report analysis 
3. Do izimbizo and ward committees attempt to solve 
those problems through processes of reasoned 
deliberation? 
Examine principles of 
EPG in relation to the 
policy document 
*Theoretical analysis 
*Document analysis  
*Report analysis 
4. Do these experiments devolve decision and 
implementation power to local action units? 
Examine institutional 
design of EPG in 




*Legislative analysis  
 
5. Are local action units not autonomous, but rather 
recombinant and linked to each other and to 
supervening levels of the state in order to allocate 
resources, solve common and cross-border problems 
and diffuse innovations and learning. 
Examine EPG, in 
relation to Msunduzi 






6. Do the experiments colonize and transform existing 
state institutions? Are the administrative bureaucracies 
charged with solving these problems restructured into 
deliberative groups? Does the power of these groups to 
implement the outcomes of their deliberations, 
therefore, come from the authorization of state bodies 
 
Examine EPG municipal 
institutional design as 





*Legislative analysis  
*Report analysis 
7. Is there a rough equality of power, for the purposes 




design, and policy as 
well as reports 
 
*Theoretical analysis 








Background study: an analysis of the context of citizen participation in Msunduzi institutions 
 
Introduction 
The current Msunduzi Municipality and its system of governance represent an evolution of 
various forms of governance in Pietermaritzburg that have shaped its present form. By way of 
orienting the reader to the purpose of this chapter and to better appreciating its circumstances, a 
brief description of the current municipality and institutions will be given. Chapter Two will 
discuss how the City‟s institutions have been shaped since the founding of the town, through to 
the introduction and dismantling of the apartheid system of governance in 1994. This chapter is 
important for a comparative analysis and to create an understanding of the new set of 
participatory institutions that replace the old system of governance. While it gives an account of 
the principles that governed the old institutions, it also introduces the dynamics of the principles 
that followed on from them.  
Founding of the city of Pietermaritzburg  
Pietermaritzburg developed from 1838 as a Voortrekker town (Voortrekker describes Dutchmen 
who had migrated from Cape Town to the interior of South Africa, having arrived there from the 
Netherlands in Europe) and was later, from 1842, annexed by the British and used as the 
administrative capital of the colony of Natal (Mkhize, 1998: 11). The administrative capital of 
Natal consisted of areas demarcated for different racial groups, even before racial segregation 
was legalized by the Group Areas Act of 1950 (Mkhize, 1998: 18). The Indians and Coloureds 
were found on the eastern side of the city, while Africans, with the exception of those at Sobantu 
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Village, resided in the southwestern side of the city areas such as Edendale, Ashdown and 
Vulindlela (Mkhize, 1998: 18). In areas like Edendale people of different racial groups mingled 
together very well, in spite of the seeming separation of the groups. According to Wills (1988: 
33), the Pietermaritzburg Municipality was already in operation as early as 1848, under the 
appointed Municipal Board of Commissioners which was soon, however, succeeded by an 
elected Town Council in 1854. The Msunduzi Municipality has in its midst one of the largest 
traditional areas, known as Vulindlela, with a total of four chiefs. With the rapid evolution of the 
town from a Voortrekker „dorp‟ to being a colonial administration capital of the British Empire, 
this meant that after 1994 the institutions of democracy in the city of Pietermaritzburg, as well as 
those of the local municipality, were fairly new and inaccessible. 
Institutional arrangements 
The remarkable feature of institutional design and arrangement in the city of Pietermaritzburg 
has been heavily shaped by the values the city inherited from the apartheid system. In the 
following extract, Lawrence (1988: 218) gives an account of the circumstances in which the city 
municipality of today finds itself:   
The upshot (was) apartheid, the ideology of separate development, distinguishing 
between people according to arbitrarily defined racial criteria, fundamental to the 
Nationalist plan.  
In the same paragraph Lawrence (1988: 219) says that “The effect on cities like Pietermaritzburg 
was profound. The population was re-organized into racially exclusive enclaves, where people 
were supposed to lead most of their lives within the confines of their assigned ghetto”. The 
profound effect of this ideological arrangement in the governance of the people was the direct 
impact it had on the city‟s institutions of governance. Local government in greater 
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Pietermaritzburg was organized in accordance with the policy of “own affairs.” (Truluck, 1990: 
11).  The city‟s institutions of governance were divided along racial lines, with each race group 
having its own separate institutions. Lawrence explained that Whites, Coloureds, Indians and 
Africans “occupy [ied], for the most part, separate political universes, each encouraged to 
impinge on the others as minimally as possible” (1988: 220). 
Wills (1988: 33), felt that “this „apartheid city‟ form has been maintained for decades by a 
plethora of laws governing where people may live and move, but has its origins in the founding 
of the town (or more correctly the „dorp‟) by the Voortrekkers, and its subsequent growth as a 
colonial capital under British rule.”  In other words, segregation long before the emergence of 
apartheid was already a policy of government at local level. Wills (1988: 41) observes that: 
Segregation in Pietermaritzburg, as in other South African cities, had evolved as the 
natural outcome of the large social distance that had emerged between whites and other 
racial groupings, and of cultural and ethnic pluralism, combined with different levels of 
technological development (41). Long before the Group Areas Act was passed the 
principle that Africans were temporary sojourners in the „white‟ City had been an integral 
part of urban planning, and the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the Amended Act 
of 1937 effectively kept African residential areas on the distant fringes of the City.  
No doubt exists that the central government was successful in its attempts to have the institutions 
of separate development implemented as evidenced by the policy of “own affairs” and even in 
Pietermaritzburg. In Pietermaritzburg there was ambivalence in the manner that the municipality 
pursued the goals of this ideology. Mkhize (1998: 32-33) pointed out that: 
 It appears that the City Council was uncomfortable or ambivalent with the way the 
Group Areas Act was implemented from the top down. During the meeting of 5 June 
1961, in sympathy with Indians and Coloureds, the Council distanced themselves from 
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the actions of the Group Areas Act Board. However, it has also been pointed out that the 
residential segregation was ultimately implemented in Pietermaritzburg and the 
establishment of Imbali Township, rather than the expansion of Sobantu Village, was one 
such example. 
Given the exclusive nature of such a policy, it inevitably had a negative effect on municipal 
institutions and processes, with one consequence being that democratic arrangements with those 
emphasizing and ultimately relying on citizen or community participation, in particular, became 
underdeveloped and undervalued. Such an arrangement would also have an impact on the 
delivery of essential services such as roads and housing. This was later to serve as fuel to the 
conflict that ensued and ultimately led to negotiations geared towards transformation and the 
sharing of power.   
Racially-based segregation of local government in Pietermaritzburg  
Based on the policy of segregation, the initial Pietermaritzburg Municipality in 1848 only 
included areas that were under the new borough (Truluck, 1990: 12).  Areas that were outside the 
borough were automatically excluded from the Municipality‟s administration. All the areas in the 
Vulindlela and greater Edendale were outside the Municipal boundaries and the administration of 
these areas was left to the people of those areas. Truluck (1990:16) explained: 
Administration of the area is deliberately fragmented, and most of the population of the 
city is denied meaningful representation at a local government level. Before the 1988 
elections, the city council showed an increasing awareness of the indefensibility of this 





Own affairs compared with general affairs 
The Nationalist government made a number of efforts to try to justify the separation of areas by 
introducing a number of structures for black residents these structures were an alternative to an 
inclusive, non-racial, local government. The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 01) states 
that “through spatial separation, influx control, and a policy of „own management for own areas‟, 
apartheid aimed to limit the extent to which affluent white municipalities would bear the 
financial burden of servicing disadvantaged black areas.” What will be discussed separately are 
the institutions that were introduced by the national government for areas that had been left 
outside the traditional white municipalities. Under these, the institutions that were set for the 
governing of African people, the Coloured people and the Indian people and their particular 
application in the City of Pietermaritzburg, will be mentioned.  
Black local administration 
The areas in Vulindlela under the supervision of the chiefs remained outside the control of the 
Municipality. The Edendale area also remained outside the official borough of the Municipality. 
However, some of these areas were partly responsible for the actions that government took in 
regard to their governance. The Edendale community, for example, resisted being put under the 
control and supervision of the white municipality. One reason put forward to explain this refusal 
is that there was a fear that the involvement of the white municipality would introduce changes 
to the existing system of the freehold of land and that rates would have to be payable for the 
services rendered by the Municipality. Traditional leaders were given the responsibility of 
assuming the administration of these communally owned areas (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998: 01). The founding of the government of KwaZulu in 1970, which was to be 
responsible for all the areas that were considered to be outside the borders of South Africa, as 
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well as its municipalities, was intended to strengthen the position that areas such as Vulindlela 
and Edendale were outside the City‟s municipality. Some small rural townships (the so-called 
„R293 towns‟) were given their own administrations, but these lacked real powers (White Paper 
on Local Government, 1998: 01).  
In spite of the laws that sought to restrict the presence of black people in towns, the government 
had come to accept the fact that some populations were a permanent part of the towns/cities, 
hence the founding of Sobantu village in 1927/8 (Mkhize, 1998: 19). In 1966 a site was chosen 
for the building of the township of Imbali. In 1971 the Bantu Affairs Administration Act was 
passed. It appointed the Administration Boards, which removed responsibility for townships 
from white municipalities (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 02).  In 1980, the 
townships of Imbali and Ashdown, and the freehold area of Slangpruit, were excised from the 
Pietermaritzburg Municipality and put under the control of the South Africa Development Trust 
(Aitchison, 1993: 40). Government plans were to hand over these townships, together with the 
large freehold area of Edendale, to KwaZulu (Atchison, 1993: 40).   
In 1977, Community Councils were introduced. Community Councils were elected bodies, but 
had no meaningful powers and few resources and they never gained political credibility (White 
Paper on Local Government, 1998: 02). A corollary of this policy was the denial of political 
rights for black people at all levels of government (Cameron, 1999: 76). Various advisory 
bodies, namely Black Boards, Urban Bantu Councils and community Councils, some nominated 
and some elected, were set up for black townships, but these proved to be ineffective (Cameron, 
1999: 76), mainly because of their failure to garner the support of the people they were supposed 
to govern. Segregation was a major outcome of not only a sophisticated policy but also a 
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sophisticated institutional arrangement that could only be achieved through some power-sharing 
deal involving the central government, together with the municipalities.  
 The Black Local Authorities (BLA) Act, Number 192 of 1982, came into effect on 1 August 
1983 and possessed fairly extensive powers (Aitchison, 1993: 40). Black Local Authorities 
(BLAs) replaced Community Councils (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 02). This 
structure was faced with many difficult challenges.  BLA had no significant revenue base and 
were seen as politically illegitimate from the start as they were rejected by the community 
(White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 02).  To finance township services, BLAs were forced 
to increase the rent and service charges (in some cases up to 100%) of township residents, many 
of whom were already living below the breadline (Cameron, 1999, 78). As part of the 
arrangement of the BLA, town councils were set up for Imbali, Sobantu and Ashdown. The 
Inkatha Freedom Party tried to gain control of the town councils but there was a growing 
resistance to the role of black town councillors in black local authorities, who were increasingly 
seen as puppets of the apartheid state (Aitchison, 1993: 40). In August 1983 two prominent 
Imbali councillors resigned, to be followed by the entire Ashdown council (Aitchison, 1993: 40). 
In the run-up to the new elections in Ashdown only two (new) candidates presented themselves 
and the elections had to be cancelled (Atchison, 1993: 40). In Imbali only two new candidates 
stood (Atchison, 1993: 40). In the late 1980s the apartheid state attempted to prop up collapsing 
BLAs and calm political tensions by redirecting funds to disadvantaged areas (White Paper on 
Local Government, 1998: 03). A system of ad-hoc intergovernmental grants was developed to 
channel resources to collapsing townships (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 03). 
Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and Joint Services Boards (JSBs) were established to 
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channel funds to black areas. However, these interventions were however, “too little too late.” 
(White Paper on Local Goverment, 1998: 03). 
Coloured and Indians local government 
After the Nationalist Party (NP) was elected to power in 1948, racial segregation in respect of 
Coloureds and Indians intensified (Cameron, 1999: 77). The Group Areas Act of 1950 made 
provision for separate residential areas for Coloureds and Indians (Cameron, 1999: 77). Separate 
structures were not introduced, however, until the passing of the Group Areas Amendment Act 
of 1962, which made provision for such bodies (Cameron, 1999: 77). Advisory bodies called 
Management Committees and Local Affairs Committees (LACs) were created for Coloureds and 
Indians (Cameron, 1999: 77). Coloured and Indian residents paid rates to the Pietermaritzburg 
Municipality, but lived in segregated suburbs and were entitled to vote only for their respective 
Local Affairs Committees, which were established in 1963 (Truluck, 1990: 11). These Local 
Affairs Committees were purely advisory, nothing more, nothing less (Truluck, 1990: 12). 
According to Robert Cameron (1999: 76), only four Indian LACs had evolved into independent 
local authorities and no Coloured Management Committee did so. The major reasons for this 
were the lack of financial viability, lack of trained staff and political opposition by Coloureds 
and Indians to these apartheid structures (Cameron, 1999: 76). In the 1960s, „Coloured‟ and 
„Indian‟ Management Committees were established as advisory bodies to white municipalities 






On the liberal traditions of the Municipality 
Representative democracy compared with participatory democracy 
In Pietermaritzburg prior to the new arrangement there is no question that representative 
democracy was privileged over the participation of the community. After the Municipal Board of 
Commissioners was replaced by an elected Town Council in 1954, the City‟s new institutions of 
governance ushered in the new era of democracy, which encouraged the representation of the 
community in the governance of the town (Wills, 1988: 33). However, it does not appear that the 
City had made any arrangements to encourage community participation in the governance of the 
town apart from the elected representatives. Even the existing representative system in the City 
was based on the exclusion of other race groups. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of South 
African local government had been the existence of a racial division of powers. In practice, with 
the exception of the limited Coloured and Indian representation in the Cape Province, only 
whites could vote and stand for election at local government level (Wills, 1988: 33). The City 
remained in this position of exclusive governance for a long time (Truluck, 1990:  11). From the 
early days, black people were said to be represented by their Chiefs in political structures (and 
traditional areas) and this concept of self-rule or self-government was based on the belief that the 
Chiefs and Izinduna (Izinduna are chiefs‟ right hand men, in charge of various smaller units of 
the chiefdom) were the best people through which black people could act and who could attend 
to their various problems and concerns. The following extract shows how the entire City 
remained in the hands of a few councillors who were part of a minority. 
Until the October 1988 elections, the borough was divided into five wards, with three 
councillors each and consisted of a 15 member white City Council who administered the 
entire borough (Truluck,1990: 11). 
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During this time the “central government dictated that the elections be contended on a single 
councillor per ward basis, and thus 15 wards were delimited” (Truluck, 1990:  12).  The council 
also delimited an equal number of wards for the Indian areas of the city and five for the Coloured 
areas. Effectively, the white councillors controlled the affairs of the Municipality through 
standing committees (Truluck, 1990: 12). Given this, it is not clear how the Municipality in May 
1987 found that the City Council “accepted the idea of a single non-racial council, a delimited 
city into non-racial wards and proposed that all adults resident in the city be eligible to vote” 
(Truluck, 1990: 12). See also Lawrence, 1988: 219.   It could be as a result of pressure exerted on 
the Municipality from outside to transform or perhaps an incidence of internal democratization 
within the Municipality. These proposals were presented to the Executive Committee of the 
Natal Provincial Administration, but were rejected (Truluck, 1990: 12).  As an alternative, the 
city council introduced a “consensus” voting system, in which CLAC (Coloured Local Affairs 
Committee) and ILAC (Indian Local Affairs Committee) members were asked to participate in a 
show of hands, or straw vote, prior to the counting of the official (whites only) vote (Truluck, 
1990:  12). In theory, white councillors were supposed to take cognisance of the majority vote, as 
expressed in the consensus vote. Even this limited attempt to broaden the representativeness of 
the “city” council fell into disrepute when newly elected (white) National party and Independent 
Councillors refused to allow a straw vote on the election of the Mayor and Deputy-Mayor after 
the October 1988 elections (Truluck, 1990: 12). Because of the non-participatory element of the 
reform of these institutions, CLAC and ILAC enjoyed little support from their communities. 
Despite the consensus voting system “about 300 people passed a vote of no-confidence in the 
City Council, ILAC and CLAC” (Truluck: 12). Lawrence (1988: 219) stated that, the ILAC and 
CLAC members did not participate willingly or fully in this system because they wanted full 
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voting rights. Accordingly, organs of political representation, initially community representation 
led to these communities becoming alienated from City government (Lawrence, 1988: 220). 
Participation in government institutions was never an option for the Pietermaritzburg 
Municipality. The character of the government and its institutions was top-down, with the city 
council making decisions on behalf of all the community members, including the excluded 
members. Although the level of violence in major parts of the Pietermaritzburg Municipality in 
the 1980s was characterized by ANC/ IFP rivalry, it may also be a testimony to the fact that 
people‟s feelings were suppressed and they needed democratic institutions that would be more 
inclusive. The lack of proper participation by communities in the Pietermaritzburg Municipality 
was one of the pitfalls of governance. 
Centralization compared with decentralization 
The question of the decentralization of institutions became an important topic of debate in the 
local government following the dismantling of apartheid institutions in 1994. Recently the 
Msunduzi Municipality has taken the decentralization of its institutions quite seriously, resulting 
in the adoption of the new policy document which has helped put the new institutions of ward 
committees and processes of public consultation in place. If we look closely at some incidents 
that involved government and its engagement with the people prior to 1994 in Pietermaritzburg, 
we can learn about the nature of institutional arrangement with regards to centralization and 
decentralization. Evidence points to the fact that there was juxtaposition of centralization and 
decentralization of power in the Municipality. First of all, the introduction of the ideology of 
separate development was a form of limited decentralization on the part of the Municipality, 
although the reasons concerned enhancing white power to further undermine other groups. 
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Again, when there was an increase of violence in the city, from as early as 1983, it resulted in the 
stepping in of the national government to local affairs to help resolve some issues. This 
intervention by the national government led to a certain degree of centralization of power by the 
Municipal authorities in the way governance of the City was carried out. This limited evidence 
shows that there was no clear policy line with regards to how power should be centralized or 
decentralized. This might be an indication that the City‟s authorities may have appealed to any 
method of governance – to centralize or to decentralize - depending on the objectives to be 
achieved at any particular time. The story of the City is one of conflicting principles between 
decentralization and centralization. When all the authority was in the hands of the city council, 
this was a form of centralization at local level. Again, when the national government got 
involved over certain issues, this indicated centralization of governance at a higher level than 
that of the Municipality. When the excluded community was allowed to govern its own affairs 
this was characteristic of a decentralized Municipality.   The following extract from Lawrence 
(1988, 218-20) explains the situation of administration in the Pietermaritzburg Municipality prior 
to 1994:   
Military forces were dispatched by central government in a determined endeavour to 
quench unrest and institute order by whatever means deemed necessary. Thus, for the 
time being, real administrative power no longer lies with the government officials of 
Imbali and elsewhere, but with the South African Defence Force. Today the City‟s 
political universe comprises insiders and outsiders. The insiders are the whites, whose 
fifteen elected white representatives on the City Council, with the assistance of senior 
bureaucrats, all of whom are whites as well, govern the municipal area that is officially 
Pietermaritzburg. Rather than creating a distinct, exclusive city government for both the 
Indian and Coloured racial groups, which the ideology of apartheid requires, the 
Nationalist leaders in 1966 opted for Local Affairs Committees. Moreover, Local Affairs 
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Committees have been granted only advisory powers; final decisions are taken by the 
City Council. This also discourages participation. Councils, then city councils, were 
envisaged for the African urban townships. Zealous apartheid planning meant that the 
City Council had to transfer its responsibility for Sobantu to central government in 1973.  
A local government‟s authority is determined by the South African Parliament or, in 
effect, by the Nationalist Government. The City Council is hemmed in: the manner of 
Indian and Coloured KwaZulu came about in 1970. African residential areas in the 
western sector of Pietermaritzburg were scheduled to be absorbed into KwaZulu. 
 
In 1966 legislation which established Bantustans was passed. Under this new structure the 
government of KwaZulu had its own legislature based in Ulundi. The structure was run in 
conjunction with the King of KwaZulu, alongside a variety of chiefs from KwaZulu and Natal. 
This, in a nutshell, was a characterization of the legacy of the centralization of power in the more 
formal authoritarian institutions of a King against the will of the majority of people. In 
Pietermaritzburg, especially in the surrounding areas, violence increased in 1985 and 1986 
(Aitchison, 1993). In places like Nxamalala, Bhobhonono, KwaDambuza, Imbali and Elandskop 
the situation deteriorated and there was open confrontation between the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the United Democratic Front (UDF).  
In spite of the fact that municipalities existed in a local sphere of government under the apartheid 
regime, they remained heavily centralized, due to the fact that they had to account to the central 
government for every action they took. The Municipality retained their normal responsibilities 
such as the construction and maintenance of roads, supply of water and electricity, provision of 
council housing, traffic control, refuse collection, health services, public library services, 
museums and fire-fighting services. They were nevertheless required by the central government 
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to institute its policies without question.  In terms of power-sharing in Pietermaritzburg, power 
remained exclusively centralized in the white municipal council. This council was responsible 
for all the planning within the municipality. 
Under the apartheid regime, decentralization was not seen as a possible institutional arrangement 
which could have the effect of unifying citizens and therefore this aspect of the system had 
remained under-explored during this period. The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 20) 
states that, “in the past, local government has tended to make its presence felt in communities by 
controlling or regulating citizens‟ actions.” This was also manifested in the array of institutions 
that were set up separately from the main municipalities of the white people. Black local 
administration Coloured and Indian local governments were all created to keep the power of the 
white municipalities, while attempting to manage the areas excluded from the jurisdiction of 
these municipalities.  The point made in the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 20) that, 
“while regulation remains an important municipal function, it must be supplemented with 
leadership, encouragement, practical support and resources for community action”, needs further 
emphasis. It can be concluded that the important feature of a decentralized municipality was 
conspicuously missing in both the colonial and apartheid era municipal structures.  
Consolidating forces for a more participatory municipality 
The fact that the City‟s new institutions, which look to encourage participation, have been put in 
place following the dismantling of those of the apartheid period, hardly deserves mention. A 
synopsis of the history of transformation and the reforms within the Municipality will no doubt 
provide a picture of a city that did not only succumb to external pressure demanding reformation, 
but was also subject to internal pressure as well. The outcry advocating some sort of institutional 
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reform became urgent as the 1984 uprising gathered momentum and civics, along with other 
community bodies, started to organize (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 03). The 
Imbali protest in 1984 following the announcement that the minister of Cooperation and 
Development, Dr Piet Koonhof would be visiting the township in order to inaugurate the new 
community council, is one example (Mkhize, 1998: 06). Cameron (1999) recorded:  
Furthermore, many protest actions took place at the local level, targeting racially-based 
local government structures as symbols of the greater apartheid order. These actions 
included rent and service charges boycotts which added to the problems experienced by 
an already financially vulnerable local government system.  
The rallying cry of these bodies was the appalling social and economic conditions in townships 
and Bantustans (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 03). The chief weapons used by these 
organizations were the organized boycott of rental and service changes, as well as consumer 
boycotts, which proved to be quite effective (White Paper on Local Government,  1998: 03).  
This crisis in local government became a major force leading to the national reform process 
which began in 1990 (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 03). National debate about the 
future of local government took place in the Local Government Negotiating Forum, alongside 
the national negotiating process. Many local authorities simply did not have the financial basis, 
political legitimacy or administrative ability to govern their areas (Heymans, 1988). Although 
additional structures, such as Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and Joint Services Boards 
(JSBs), were introduced to effect transfers between more and less affluent areas and to provide 
channels for development support, they also operated under the cloud of apartheid (Heymans, 
1988). Against this background, many local governments and other role-players, such as the 
civic associations and business groups, started talks at local level during the 1980s and early 
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1990s (Heymans, 1988). However, the broader legislative framework limited the scale of these 
processes and in many areas they never even started (Heymans, 1988).  
Institutional criteria used for governance post-1994 
The founding Constitution was the first document to clearly state the principles that would 
inform the new structures of governance, particularly those of the local government. The 
Constitution set the guidelines and the parameters of the new country and the direction that it 
was going to take. The Constitution clearly stipulates that the country is to espouse institutions 
that are more democratic and participatory in design. Chapter 7, section 152 (e), states that 
municipalities are “to encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations 
in the matters of local government.”  This is a clear acknowledgement by the Constitution that 
participation in the affairs of government by ordinary citizens is important. 
Redistributing the dividends of democracy from the centre to the citizens  
As the process of constitutional change unfolded at national, provincial and regional level, new 
opportunities for local negotiation inevitably emerged. By 1993, the Local Government 
Negotiating Forum (LGNF) had been established, providing the context for negotiations between 
some of the major stakeholders in local government (Heymans, 1994: 02). The White Paper on 
Local Government was the initial document that was to lead towards legislation that would 
transform the system of local government once and for all.  Mohammed Valli Moosa, Minister 
for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development (1998: v), declared, in appraisal of the 
White Paper on Local Government:     
In terms of the new Constitution, local government is a sphere of government in its own 
right and now no longer a function of national or provincial government. Local 
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government has also been given a distributive status and vote in building democracy and 
promoting socio-economic development. This White Paper… establishes the basis for a 
system of local government which is centrally concerned with working with local citizens 
and communicates to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality 
of their lives.  
It is clear from these words that the intentions of reforms in the local government was that such 
reforms would contribute to the building of democracy and promoting socio-economic 
development.  In building democracy, the role of participation by ordinary citizens was clearly 
recognized from the beginning.  
Cameron stated that “The active involvement of the public in decision-making and overseeing 
the management of local authorities can enhance the ability of the local authority to address the 
needs of the public sensitively and appropriately” (Cameron, 1999: 24). Participatory governance 
was thus seen as the policy line that would succeed previous policy frameworks for democratic 
government. This policy would help shape and give direction to the current local government 
institutions, which were, “albeit amidst the flaws of apartheid, essentially based on principles of 
„representative democracy” (Cameron, 1999: 24). 
 
Partial conclusion 
This chapter has sketched a history of municipal organization in the Msunduzi area and found 
that there is no foundation, nor any traditional system in place, to ensure the protection and 
implementation of new participatory systems in the municipal system after 1994. This effectively 
means that the new institutional arrangements under the new dispensation are completely 
experimental and have no basis, foundation or any pre-existing support structures that can be 
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adopted from the old institutions. The political culture in the municipality remained heavily 
centralized, or limited by legislative nuances of the central government. Although some form of 
decentralization was found in the old order, this was based on racially exclusive policies which 
have no place under the new municipality, which seeks to enhance inclusive democracy.  
In Chapter Two we learn that the “own affairs” approach might have oriented the excluded 
population to importance of the local government and “self-rule”, while ceding to the central 
authority. This chapter helps us to recognize the fact that, given the history of the area, the fact 
that it has only been since the dawn of the democratic era that the government has acknowledged 
the value of public participation within its systems, any participatory institution would have to be 
proactive and visibly functional in order for it to encourage the community to participate 
voluntarily in it. The spelling out of their need for community engagement, as stipulated in the 
constitution, is an obvious admission of this fact.  The following chapters discuss the more 











Empowered Participatory Governance: The Msunduzi Community Participation Policy and the 
institutional design of Ward committees 
 
Introduction 
The Msunduzi community participation policy provides for a system of ward committees as one 
framework in an array of institutions aimed at deepening participatory governance within the 
Msunduzi Municipality. This framework of municipal participatory governance is actually 
provided for in an act of parliament called the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. It is in 
Chapter 4 of this Act that a framework for ward committees is spelt out. Under this chapter 
Municipalities are encouraged to form ward committees for the purpose of increasing community 
participation (55).  
The question remains, of course, as to the nature of the participation envisaged under the 
framework of the ward committees and the extent of change this will require from the existing 
institutions of the municipality. To put it simply, the question is, can ward committees foster and 
deepen participatory democracy as is envisaged in the national policy framework of participatory 
governance? And can this model match the institutional design framework envisaged in the EPG 
model? Another matter which is relevant to the issue of democracy and which can broaden the 
spectrum of questions pertaining to participatory governance is whether or not this framework 
can provide the platform for all members from the different political parties, and different sectors 
of the communities, to engage each other as equals? This system is intended to assist in 
improving the political abilities of all the participants through inclusion. If this was to come true 
in the Msunduzi Municipality then it could help build the already in-dispute system of 
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representative democracy. Before we can begin to assess or provide answers to these questions, 
one question that needs to be answered is that of the practicality of the ward committees. 
On the principal design features of ward committees 
Practical orientation of the ward committees 
The benefits of a ward committee with a practical focus is that, to use the words of Fung and 
Wright, “it creates situations in which actors accustomed to competing with one another for 
power or resources might begin to cooperate and build more congenial relations” (Fung and 
Wright; 2003: 16).   
In terms of the EPG model any institution that aims for success in driving and yielding effective 
citizen participation should have a practical focus. Practical focus here means that a deliberative 
body in any participatory experiment must have a clear focus on real-world problems that 
participants know of and can relate to. The Porto Alegre participatory budget is a good example 
of this arrangement.  In the case of Porto Alegre the main concern is drawing up a sensible 
budget for the city by way of bringing in the community to participate in policy formulation. The 
practical orientation of the ward committee system, as detailed in the Msunduzi community 
participation policy, is not clear. Although it is not clear which issues the ward committee should 
handle; the policy document specifically requires ward committees to form subcommittees that 
will, in turn, deal with many specific issues that are of concern to the community, such as safety 
and security issues, health and education. Health and security seem to be practical issues that the 
community can deal with. One may argue that the role accorded to the subcommittee is the same 
as was given to the ward committee itself. Whatever the case may be, however, the policy 
document needs to specifically mandate the committee itself to deal with these issues. Then the 
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committee may decide if it wants to pursue the issue via subcommittees. Engaging 
subcommittees in carrying out the function of the ward has the advantage of increasing the 
spectrum of participants in any discussion of the ward committee, whilst reducing the number of 
participants. This increases the effectiveness of the deliberations. It may be said that the actual 
size of the committee is increased as a result of co-option to form subcommittees. Nevertheless 
the ward committee can maintain its grip on practical concerns affecting the community and the 
community can gain experience in addressing community issues. There could be a chance that 
even the more usually marginalized people in the community, for example women, can take part 
in these local deliberations.  
On the negative side of this is the fact that, while a number of people may be involved in the 
processes of the municipality, there is a danger of limiting the very space necessary for effective 
problem-solving. A proper forum or platform for people to make meaningful contributions to the 
processes of ward committees is vitally important.  The ward committees themselves should be 
encouraged to engage in debate over how they would organize themselves according to the area 
of need, so that each issue or problem of concern that any respective ward committee decides to 
deal with can be successfully dealt with using ideas from the community. The policy document 
should leave the issue of implementation of programmes to ward committees themselves, to 
avoid being too prescriptive, as this may limit the very processes of deliberation and problem-
solving that the policy tries to put in place.     
Bottom-up participation 
The notion of “bottom-up” participation is offered in direct opposition to the notion of the “top-
down” service delivery typical of the South African experiments. Bottom-up participation 
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implies the kind of service delivery, or an approach to the delivery of public goods, which is 
centred on the people. According to this definition, being centred on the people means that at 
every stage of the programme the government has to offer or deliver to its citizens the very same 
people affected (whether directly or indirectly) by these services. They should themselves be 
involved in the process of planning such delivery. In other words, the participation of the people 
is central to the policy framework of the participatory experiment. The EPG model emphasizes 
the notion that citizens cannot be effective deliberators or participants unless they are 
empowered to take action. Therefore power to take action by ordinary citizens is the cornerstone 
of the notion of bottom-up participation. Effectively this refers to a situation where citizens have 
the ability, as well as the capacity, to mobilize themselves to take action in matters that concern 
their own lives. It is in this area that the government can be of use to deliver resources in order to 
make this goal possible.   
Fung and Wright say, with regards to bottom-up participation, that “effective solutions to certain 
kinds of novel and fluid public problems may require the variety of experience and knowledge 
offered more by diverse, relatively more open-minded citizens and field operatives, than by 
distant and narrowly trained experts” (2003: 16). What is being argued here is that not all 
problems can be fully understood or properly attended to by people with a specific area of 
expertise who may reasonably encounter problems which are alien to them, or require other areas 
of expertise in order for them to be solved. This is a view that many problems can only be 
effectively solved through the participation of the very people affected by the problem, although 
this does not preclude experts assisting, too.  
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The policy document makes it very clear that the kind of participation envisaged by the 
municipality is that of bottom-up participation. The document says that one of its objectives it is 
to “give communities the opportunity to exercise real control over all stages of a programme that 
affects them…” (2005: 02). Whether or not the design of the ward committees necessarily 
promotes this remains an issue worth more exploration. It also should be borne in mind that if the 
ward committees are to be truly bottom-up entities, in terms of their participation, there are 
certain design features and aspects that need to be taken into account. The first of these is to see 
to it that the ordinary members of the community make up the greatest number of the committee 
members. This does not mean to say that the greater the representation the greater the 
participation. What is meant here is that until the citizens themselves are put in charge of the 
bodies aimed to resolve their own issues, and until these are backed up by the necessary 
resources, there is a danger that these bodies may become mere tokens. When one observes how 
the ward committee is structured one will find that most members that make it up are ordinary 
citizens. In reality, ordinary citizens may not be so ordinary at all. They may not be ordinary in 
the sense that they may be important members of the community such as business people. What 
is being emphasized here by the inclusion of ordinary people is that they must not be linked to a 
formal position in the municipality.  
The policy document indicates that the person who shall be responsible for chairing such a 
committee will be a ward councillor (2005: 04).  Some problems may result from the inclusion 
of a ward councillor in the ward committees. This is not to exclude the various positive benefits 
that a councillor can bring to ward committees as an official representative of the community in 
the municipal legislature. The problem with their inclusion in the ward committees stems from 
the fact that the majority of most of them are aligned with political parties. The issue of concern 
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here has to do with impartiality. How impartial can their thinking be, with their obvious political 
interests?  Piper and Deacon (2006: 23) come to a sobering conclusion in their assessment of the 
interaction between the partisan councillor and the ward committee. They observe that “in most 
historically black areas, and especially those under IFP control, ward committees will remain 
firmly under party hegemony” (Piper and Deacon, 2006: 23).  Impartiality of councillors at all 
times seems to be thus far only an ideal.  
At this level of community participation the most fundamental challenge is that of integrating the 
community to begin to address its problems as a unit rather than along divisive party lines, often 
encouraged by the culture of representative democracy. The benefit of direct participation by 
ordinary community members is captured in the words of Fung and Wright (2006: 34), who say 
that “it increases accountability and reduces the length of the chain of agency that accompanies 
political parties and their bureaucratic apparatus”.  When political parties become involved in 
providing services to the people, or even to state officials, there is much bureaucratic etiquette 
which, in the end, may lead to delays in service delivery. The community thus needs to take 
charge of the simple things they are capable of dealing with, rather than leaving these in the 
hands of the officials. This has an advantage of limiting the time taken by other officials in 
dealing with them. Therefore the bottom up participation in the ward committees, as opposed to 
the top-down approach, can only improve the delivery of basic and essential services to the 
people. The involvement of the ward councillor can be disastrous if not dealt with at a policy 
level, as there is always a danger that these ward councillors may be pressurized into taking the 
views of the people or parties who have voted for them into greater account, at the expense of 
serving ordinary community members.   
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On the other hand, the inclusion of a ward councillor to serve in the ward committee can have a 
positive consequence. One of these positive consequences is that the councillor may serve as the 
necessary vein that links the ordinary citizens directly to the council which is the core decision-
making body in the municipality. The councillor can also help to ensure that ordinary citizens are 
informed of the council‟s actions and decisions and are aware of the reasons behind them. This 
can help improve democratic practice within the municipality. However, the fact that these 
municipal officials are mandated by law to be part of these committees does not mean that they 
have to run these committees, as the ward committee members themselves should have more 
power than the councillor in such a forum. The councillor should also be made to report to the 
committee members and not vice versa. This arrangement would ensure that the ward 
committees do not become mere extensions of the representative democracy system, or function 
as an advisory committee at the discretion of the councillor, but that they should form a 
necessary and an active participatory institution of the municipality, without which no decision 
can be made within the municipality. 
Deliberative solution generation 
The idea of deliberative solution generation is an important aspect of the institutional 
arrangement envisaged by the EPG model concerning the way that ward committees function. 
Deliberation in this thesis basically means a discussion that members of a group enter into. This 
is different from a kind of deliberation in which members could argue with each in order to find 
solutions to their problems. One of the familiar aspects of the latter kind of decision-making is 
strategic negotiation. In this decision-making process, “parties use decision-making procedures 
to advance their own unfettered self-interest backed by the resources and power they bring to the 
table” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 19). The Msunduzi policy document is not clear which 
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deliberative procedures are to be followed in the ward committees‟ deliberative procedures. 
Unless these deliberative procedures are spelt out there is a risk that they may not be followed 
and, worse still, is that they are not in fact followed most of the time.  The extent of the 
predominance of one kind of decision making process may be dominant in one area and not in 
another. The structure and cohesion of a discussion may be linked to the diversity of the various 
members that make up the committee. If members come from one political viewpoint they are 
more likely to agree on issues than if they come from opposing political views. 
Deliberation is different from other kinds of decision-making such as command, aggregation and 
strategic negotiation. According to the EPG model, deliberation forms the heart of participatory 
democracy. This means that other kinds of decision-making mechanisms such as command, 
aggregation and strategic negotiation are less ideal for ward committees, which aim at enhancing 
participatory democracy and improving the decision-making process by letting the communities 
speak their minds.  
Command and control    
The basic characteristic of this kind of decision-making process is that “power is vested in 
managers, bureaucrats, or other specialists, entrusted to advance the public‟s interest and 
presumed to be capable of doing so by dint of their training, knowledge, and normative 
commitments” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 19). From the analysis of the policy document, it is very 
clear that command and control is not the way the municipality wants to go. Explicitly, the 
policy document states that one of their objectives in engaging in community participation is “to 
give communities the opportunity to exercise real control over all stages of a programme that 
affects them with a view of creating a sense of ownership and thus promote their civil 
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responsibility” (2005: 02). It is clear from this account that the municipality aims to empower its 
citizens. On a more practical level, one may ask just how much the ward committees are 
currently involved in the decision-making processes of the municipality. For example, are ward 
committees empowered to propose their own projects based on local deliberations? And how 
much can the municipality support these private initiatives? These are some of the questions that 
the policy document needs to be able to answer in order to ensure that ward committees are not 
simply there to enhance the municipal representative system, or to serve as talk shops. 
Unfortunately there is nothing much in the policy document that would allow even speculation 
on this issue and, even worse, this seems to be a shortcoming of the practice.  
The document simply has too many gaps and lacks any serious thought that would enable it to do 
any justice to the goals it hopes to achieve with regard to complete public participation.  Even 
other supplementary documents such as the handbook for ward committees do not address this 
issue appropriately. The handbook could be used to further explain and extend on what the 
policy document has not.  
Aggregation 
This method of decision making involves individuals in a group combining their preferences in 
order to determine what would be the choice of the group (Fung and Wright, 2003: 19). In some 
cases, aggregative mechanisms can result in harm and lead to the failure of participatory 
experiments, because of patronage and corruption of the people involved. The policy document 
is not very clear as to the method of decision-making in the ward committees; hence it is possible 
that whenever the members cannot agree on certain issues they will resort to this method of 
decision-making. Piper and Deacon have cited this to be a particular problem in many ward 
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committees in Msunduzi. The following extract from Piper and Deacon (2006: 20) gives a clear 
picture of how some ward councillors have tried to undermine community structures in relation 
to the government-proposed ward committee system, to set up their own:  
In addition to the functioning of ward committees, the Msunduzi case also illustrates the 
centrality of ward councillors to the constitution and composition of ward committees. 
Thus while consultants were meant to institute ward committees, they did not do this in 
all cases, and several ward councillors, many from the DA, reported setting up their own 
structures. Some ward councillors reported having sectoral representation with meetings 
in localised areas, some had one mass meeting, while others co-opted people from 
existing organisations.    
This extract shows just how possible it is for politicised communities to want to engage in self-
destructive behaviours that undermine good community engagements and efforts. Such 
behaviour needs to be avoided by all means in the policy document by imposing high penalties 
for groups that fail to resolve their problems through deliberative procedures set by the 
communities themselves. Penalties could include budget cuts for ward committees that are 
problematic. Budgets do not yet exist in the ward committee system, so this is just an illustration 
of how a community can be penalised in a case where it goes against its stated public mandate.  
On the design properties of ward committees 
Devolution 
The concept of devolution in the EPG is concerned with “the reorganization of power to local 
action units…charged with devising and implementing solutions and held accountable to 
performance criteria” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 20). The extent to which devolution of power to 
ward committees can be measured is directly linked to the issue of how power works within the 
whole framework of municipal participatory governance. For example, who makes the decision 
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whether or not a taxi rank is needed in the area, where it is built and how and what should be 
taken into account when building a taxi rank? The effectiveness of the decisions made are all 
issues that need to be examined when considering the issue of devolution.  
In the policy document it is not clear how power has been devolved from the municipal council 
to ward committees. In fact the power to implement decisions cannot be devolved to ward 
committees by law (Ministerial Notice 965). What emerges clearly from the policy document is 
that ward committees are designed to deal with the most basic and specific issues affecting the 
community. Ward committees do not have the necessary powers backed up with the necessary 
infrastructure and funding exercisable under their own supervision. For them to have such 
instruments would not mean that they would have to take over the work of officials of the 
municipality. However, it needs to be made clear in the policy document that the ward 
committees can and will be supported in cases where good ideas have been generated at their 
levels. If such was to come out clearly in the municipal policy document, it would serve as a 
clear sign of the extent to which such ward committees are to be empowered. Ultimately the 
extent of devolution can also be measured accurately. 
The design feature of ward committees in the participatory governance can, in fact, be regarded 
as part of decentralization of the municipality and not of devolution of power, as power still lies 
in the hands of the municipal officials and councillors. Devolution of power is a misnomer, even 
in the area-based municipal management offices such as the Greater Edendale Development 
Initiative (GEDI) offices in Imbali and other similar institutions. This means that the only change 
that has taken place in the municipality is the decentralization of institutions such as 
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administration, but not actual devolution. Political devolution in the ward committees only exists 
in theory, but not in practice, as ward committees cannot affect the decisions of the council. 
Centralized supervision and coordination 
In terms of this property design feature, empowered local units such as ward committees cannot 
operate as autonomous, atomized sites of decision-making, but there should be linkages between 
local units with super-ordinate bodies of the municipality. The idea here is that all the ward 
committees should be managed or located within the central body which, in this case, is the 
office of the speaker. The idea of centralized supervision and co-ordination is centred on the idea 
that linking different ward committees to one another can lead to effective decision-making or 
problem solving (Fung and Wright, 2003: 21). When a ward committee in one area for example, 
encounters a problem there can be some transfer of solutions from one committee to another, 
resulting in joint problem-solving. The Msunduzi policy document has dedicated at least two key 
bodies that will be responsible for supervising and co-ordinating ward committees and their 
activities. These are ward councillors in their respective wards and the office of the speaker.  
In terms of the policy document the ward councillor is expected to hold regular ward committee 
meetings and is mandated to have regular community meetings to ensure a platform for obtaining 
input from the community and to give feedback to the community – special meetings. The 
councillor is mandated to encourage community members to attend any municipal meetings. 
There are few problems associated with this kind of arrangement, but one problem comes from 
the fact that the responsibility of co-ordination is given to councillors. Co-ordination means that 
ward committees within the municipality should find a way of interacting and sharing ideas, with 
the goal of becoming more effective in their roles as participatory institutions. The idea that the 
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councillor should be the one who plays this role may serve to take away some power and 
learning opportunities from the ordinary community members who are part of the ward 
committee. The benefit associated with the ward committees is that they give responsibility to 
ordinary community members. The negative effect of charging councillors with the 
responsibility of co-ordinating them is that this may deprive community members of a practical 
learning experience. Also, given the fact that councillors have many other responsibilities 
besides working with the ward committees, this arrangement may become time-consuming and 
deprive them of time that could be better spent on other duties and responsibilities. 
The office of the speaker is given several responsibilities concerning the supervision and co-
ordination of ward committees. The speaker is tasked with the responsibility of encouraging the 
councillors to hold ward committee meetings regularly; to encourage councillors to hold regular, 
periodic community meetings, to ensure a platform for obtaining input from the community and 
to give feedback to the community at special meetings. The speaker‟s office, as a central office 
in accordance with the EPG model requirements, is to:  
Enforce the quality of local democratic deliberation and problem-solving in a variety of 
ways: such as coordinating and distributing resources, solving problems that local units 
(ward committees in this case) cannot address by themselves, rectifying pathological or 
incompetent decision-making in failing groups, and diffusing innovations and learning 
across boundaries (Fung and Wright, 2003: 21).  
In the institutional design of the ward committees in Msunduzi there is both supervision and 
some form of co-ordination in the participatory institutional design framework. Fung and Wright 
(21) state that the role of supervision and co-ordination in the EPG model is to:  
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reinforce the quality of local democratic deliberation and problem-solving in a variety of 
ways: coordinating and distributing resources, solving problems that local units cannot 
address by themselves, rectifying pathological or incompetent decision-making in failing 
groups, and diffusing innovations and learning across boundaries.  
The question will arise with regard to the capacity of the speaker‟s office to be able to play such 
a role effectively. It is not clear from the policy document just how much time the office of the 
speaker is allocated to carry out the functions of supervision and co-ordination. The office of the 
speaker may be given these responsibilities, but in practice it may be a different issue altogether. 
It is thus crucial that the office of the speaker is given a more complete mandate and the time to 
be able to visit most of the ward committees in order to assist them in their daily functioning and 
ensure that there are enough resources for these committees to function efficiently.  
State-centred, not voluntaristic 
Before the policy of participatory governance was introduced the state did not recognize any 
form of participation, let alone a framework that would be part and parcel of state institutions. 
The EPG model requires that participatory institutions should “colonize” state institutions and 
transform formal governance institutions (Fung and Wright, 2003: 22). Ward committees are 
designed to fit into the existing set of institutions that are state-centred and are not meant to be 
additional structures which function from outside the government. Other entities which play a 
participatory role such as political organizations, civic organizations such as churches, NGOs 
and FBOs, do not form part of formal institutions of governance. Fung and Wright (2003: 22) 
stated that “EPG experiments generally seek to transform the mechanisms of state power into 
permanently mobilized deliberative-democratic, grassroots forms.”  With the institution of ward 
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committees it seems that the government is very serious about ensuring that ordinary citizens 
participate in the daily activities of government.  
However, we need to be careful not to mix separate questions, or to treat them as one, because 
this may be confusing. It is clear that the question of ward committees being deliberative and 
democratic, as well as constituting an element of grassroots level participation, is two separate 
questions. To what extent can ward committees be deliberative and democratic at the same time? 
Are ward committees comprised of grassroots level people at all times? Who constitutes the 
“grassroots”? I will ignore the former and address the latter. The concept of grassroots level 
primarily refers to previously marginalized and powerless individuals or groups of people. In the 
present study, the meaning of “grassroots” people would be extended to include any individual 
or group of people who have an interest in the activities of government, but do not formally hold 
any direct position in the institutions of government. As long as there are people who have an 
interest in participating in the ward committees and are unable to do so, because of grounds other 
than unavailability, this will ensure some form of a compromise to the deliberative-democratic 
nature of participatory institutions, as envisaged for ward committees. The fact that ward 
committees already fail to engage as many people as possible speaks volumes about the kind of 
democracy being offered at ward level and throws the ward committee system into suspicion, 
that they may very well be another body of the representative system which has been misguided 
in order to achieve some measure of public participation.   
Enabling conditions 
The issue concerning who should participate in the ward committees is linked to the issue of 
enabling conditions. There are a number of factors that determine whether or not the 
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environment is conducive to deliberations being held. Fung and Wright indicate the issue of the 
high rate of literacy in Kerala as one of the factors that enhanced the deliberative terrain in their 
participatory experiment (Fung and Wright, 2003: 23). Fung and Wright (2003: 23) explain: 
 Most fundamentally, perhaps, the likelihood that these institutional designs will generate 
the desired effects depends particularly on the balance of power between the participants 
engaged in EPG and, in particular, the configurations of non-deliberative power that 
constitute the terrain upon which structured deliberation inside EPG occurs. Participants 
will be much more likely to engage in earnest deliberation when alternatives to it – such 
as strategic domination or exit from the process altogether – are made less attractive by 
roughly balanced scales of power.  
The issue of enabling conditions is crucial in a municipality such as Msunduzi, which has a well-
known history of political intolerance, as it is imperative to talk about the issue of enabling 
conditions and act towards ensuring that the issue exists. The presence of enabling conditions 
can lead to the successful design of the ward committee and also to the functionality of the ward 
committees. The idea of having enabling conditions in any participatory experiment is prompted 
by the fact that there are many other factors that may serve to stifle what would otherwise be 
productive deliberations. Considerations such as power differentials between the deliberators 
tend to have a negative influence during any such discussions, as they become inherently unfair 
and counter-productive. To the contrary, “when individuals cannot dominate others to secure 
their first-best preference, they are often more willing to deliberate” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 
23). The policy document makes it clear that, in fulfilling this design feature, the municipality 
area-based management organizations have a responsibility to assist communities or institutions 
such as ward committees and any stakeholders, by providing the necessary information to 
encourage participation. The Msunduzi Municipality is still in the process of ensuring that all the 
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wards of the municipality have access to these offices in their local area. This would ensure the 
efficient delivery of essential services to the community. An effective policy needs to be backed 
up by adequate resources to ensure that it succeeds.  This should include the provision of 
resources for ward committees to function better. 
Partial conclusion 
The system of ward committees is a first step in the right direction by the government, in proving 
that it values public opinion. However, there are obstacles that make one question if they can 
lead to a deeper democratic culture. Strengthening democracy requires a shedding of some power 
from the central units to local units. The municipality has created a number of impediments to 
this goal. The first is imposing ward councillors as chairs of these committees. This does not help 
empower citizens to take control of their own committee, as well as the agenda. The fact that the 
policy document does not spell out which decision-making mechanisms shall be used to make 
decisions in the ward committee is also a weakness of the policy document. The area in which 
the Municipality is based has a very deep culture of political intolerance which will have an 
effect on ward committees. Any policy document that is serious about participation will need to 
guard against this. It also seems that ward committees are not well-resourced. The policy 
document remains silent on this issue. Lack of resources will ensure that even the intelligent 
ideas that the committees have never see the light of day. The document needs to make all the 







Empowered Participatory Governance: The Msunduzi Community Participation Policy and the 
institutional design of izimbizo 
 
Introduction 
The community participation policy also provides izimbizo (public meetings) as another 
institution or instrument that is aimed at deepening democracy through the policy of 
participatory governance. Imbizo (sing.) or izimbizo (plural) is an isiZulu word which means a 
gathering or meeting. Izimbizo in the Zulu culture was a designated platform from which the 
Inkosi (chief) would communicate important matters to the nation. This concept has been 
adopted by the democratic government to describe the meetings called by government officials, 
from the president to mayors. The idea of an imbizo is that there should be unmediated 
communication between the community and the politician. Msunduzi‟s community participation 
policy provides that izimbizo would be used to consult communities about pending government 
policies and decisions (MMCPP, 2005:04). The policy document states that the function of 
izimbizo is “to do report-backs to communities or to get the community‟s needs” (2005: 04). 
According to the document, these meetings should be held in community halls, churches, sports-
grounds or on open-fields (2005: 04). The nature of these meetings is such that attendance is 
normally very high, as they try to mobilize a very large number of people. Recently, these 
meetings have been characterized by catering and entertainment being provided for the 
participants. Perhaps the inclusion of catering and entertainment is a form of encouragement, as 
there seems to have been higher attendance figures at these meetings since their inception. As 
with the ward committee system, the system of izimbizo raises certain questions regarding the 
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institutional arrangements of the system, especially whether or not it will be able to advance the 
most democratic form of participatory governance. Other related questions are what exactly are 
the challenges of izimbizo and how can they be addressed. Answers to these questions call for 
another investigation, using the similar framework provided by the EPG model.  
On the principal design features of izimbizo 
On the practical orientation of izimbizo 
For izimbizo to be more effective, they need to be a forum with a clear focus on practical issues 
that affect ordinary citizens. Attention should be given to issues such as “public safety, the 
training of workers, caring for habitats, or constructing sensible municipal budgets” (Fung and 
Wright, 2003: 16). According to the policy document (2005: 04), izimbizo are used to do report-
backs to communities or to get the community‟s needs. The functions listed here raise questions 
with regard to the level of participation that the community engages in during these meetings. 
While regular report-backs to the community seem to be a prudent administrative practice, which 
may ultimately encourage community interest and involvement, there is a danger that such 
meetings may delve onto issues that are beyond the scope of practical focus and are therefore 
beyond the understanding of ordinary citizens. This is something which is discouraged in a 
successful participatory experiment. The second goal of getting community needs using izimbizo 
does not seem to ensure any significant level of participation or deliberation on practical issues 
that affect the community. This element of izimbizo proves that they have no practical focus and 
fail to engage and educate people on democratic processes. Identifying community needs may 
merely ensure that citizens are kept informed about government activities but cannot ensure 
effective community participation on practical issues, nor do the izimbizo necessarily allow 
72 
 
citizens the opportunity to interact with officials with the object of finding solutions to real issues 
they have.    
Bottom-up participation 
Msunduzi‟s policy document seems to be doing injustice to the ideal of deepening democracy, as 
it is quiet on the type of participation it envisages for izimbizo. It must address this issue head-
on. The policy needs to be clarified and have all the details laid out concerning what kind of 
participation is envisaged for these izimbizo.  The idea of bottom-up participation requires that 
the citizens take an active role in drafting the agenda and calling the meetings, to which 
government officials would then come to report on the agenda proposed by the public. The 
policy document does not highlight how this would take place; in fact the policy document is 
very clear that izimbizo are the prerogative of politicians who set the agenda. These gatherings 
employ a top-down approach to citizen participation, as opposed to bottom-up participation. This 
goes against the spirit of empowered participatory governance. 
According to Fung and Wright, the concept of bottom-up participation is linked to the issue of 
establishing “new channels for those most directly affected by targeted problems – typically 
ordinary citizens and officials in the field – to apply their knowledge, intelligence, and interest to 
the formulation of solutions” (2003: 16). There are two things that relate to the question of 
bottom-up participation, as far as izimbizo are concerned in the policy document. The first 
relates to the fact that izimbizo are called by politicians. The fact that politicians have this 
mandate has the potential to distort the agenda concerning issues of interest to the community. 
The danger with this arrangement is that community needs may be sidelined in favour of the 
political interests of the politician and whatever policy line their respective party holds.  
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These meetings seem to be in constant danger of being driven by motives and agendas not 
related to the interests of the community and, because they are effectively under the exclusive 
control of whichever sector of the municipality that chooses to call them, important issues can be 
diverted and unilateral decisions taken in the presence of the self-same citizens who ought to 
have a say in them.  This situation can be the direct result of the policy document‟s silence with 
regards to safeguarding against such occurrences. This issue needs to be looked at with a degree 
of caution, since the goal of bottom-up participation involves the giving of power to ordinary 
people who often lack such power. This does not mean that the agenda addressing the interests of 
the community can only be set by the community, as politicians also have a role to play within 
the design principle of bottom-up participation. According to the EPG model requirement, the 
community needs to be given the opportunity “to apply their knowledge, intelligence and interest 
to the formulation of solutions” (2003: 16).      
The second issue is that the concept of bottom-up participation means that channels for 
participation should be created so that ordinary citizens of the community can take part in the 
decision-making processes. This rests on two notions, according to Fung and Wright, that 
“effective solutions to certain kinds of novel and fluid public problems may require the variety of 
experience and knowledge offered more by diverse, relatively more open-minded, citizens and 
field operatives, than by distant and narrowly trained experts” (2003: 17). It is true that it may be 
necessary to consult with ordinary citizens for effective decision-making, but the question that 
remains is whether or not izimbizo can offer the right kind of platform that would allow for the 
bottom-up participation envisaged in the EPG model. Again, according to Fung and Wright, the 
“direct participation of grassroots operators increases accountability and reduces the length of the 
chain of agency that accompanies political parties and their bureaucratic apparatus” (2003: 17). 
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This is perhaps one of the strengths of the institutional design of izimbizo, because it has the 
strength of allowing direct participation of ordinary citizens in government activities. Another 
question, however is: how much of it actually takes place? Given the normal large size of these 
gatherings, surely such interaction must be severely limited.  
Deliberative solution generation 
There are a few questions that arise under this theme. First among these is whether or not in 
izimbizo there is a deliberative process at all? This question, like other questions, is affected by 
the sheer number of people in attendance at izimbizo. The process of deliberation is a fairly 
rigorous process of engagement between various participants in the discussions. Recent additions 
to these proceedings, such as the provision of food and entertainment, while ensuring increased 
attendance also dilutes the level of participation and the quality of contributions, as a large 
section of the participants have no actual interest in the proposed discussions. These issues all 
point to serious flaws in the policy document, which seems to discount the necessity of an 
effective deliberation process in izimbizo. 
Another issue that may be directly linked to the question of deliberative solution generation is 
the one of agenda setting. Who sets an agenda to be discussed at an imbizo? The question of 
agenda setting is critical to the effectiveness of deliberations, because whoever sets the agenda 
ultimately controls the outcome of the meeting. If one party has the power to set the agenda, they 
can determine which issues should be held up for public reflection and discussion and which 
issues may be excluded from such scrutiny. The policy document makes it clear that politicians 
may call these meeting at their discretion. However, if izimbizo were appropriately designed, 
provision would be made for the community to have the opportunity to set the agenda and this 
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should have been listed as a priority on the policy document.  An appropriate deliberative 
arrangement in izimbizo would allow for a proper platform for participants to do more than just 
ask questions and give opinions. The policy document needs to attend to this issue.  
Then comes the point about the manner in which the meeting is run. Is it run in a deliberative 
fashion? Fung and Wright clarify that “in deliberative decision-making, participants listen to 
each other‟s positions and generate group choices after due consideration” (2003: 17).  This 
gives a clear indication of what is probably the best practice as far as deliberative solution 
generation is concerned. The Msunduzi policy document is notably silent on this issue, so it can 
be concluded from this silence that the policy document was not properly drafted to ensure that 
deliberation would be accounted for and taken seriously in izimbizo.  
According to Fung and Wright, the results and the success of the deliberations depend upon 
participants following the procedures and norms of deliberation. The extent to which they do so 
depends on individual motives and institutional parameters (2003: 18). Msunduzi‟s policy 
document does not seem to acknowledge the necessity of procedures and norms in its design of 
izimbizo and the necessity of incorporating this institutional structure into the participation 
policy. The motives of politicians, who often have the prerogative to call the meetings, is called 
into question, let alone the fact that izimbizo often have a large number of  participants in 
attendance, something which can have a direct impact on the quality of deliberations or 
discussions, if they take place at all. Let us consider other ways that meetings could be run and 
how they fit into the design of izimbizo as a policy. These alternatives are command and control, 




Command and control 
An issue that is worth considering is that of the role of the expert in the deliberative processes of 
izimbizo. The major limitation in the institutional design of izimbizo is that state officials or 
politicians have the privilege of calling the meetings, whereas the public have a limited right to 
do so. In these meetings the politicians have the opportunity to speak the most, telling the people 
how to behave and also, when they deem fit, allowing no questions from the people. Upon close 
scrutiny, this implies that there is a degree of command and control in the institutional design of 
izimbizo. Why is it not the other way around?  The public should, in fact, be the ones that have 
the right to say more in the meetings and to call public meetings, instead of the politicians. The 
net effect of this would be that the public would be able to set an agenda which suits their needs 
and circumstances. Such an arrangement can go a long way in making sure that the public is 
empowered to make its own decisions and also gives the power to ensure that politicians are 
truly accountable to the public.  
Aggregation 
 Before the method of aggregation can be dealt with, a discussion of the process of decision-
making is very important. This is so because this method needs to be evaluated to see if it fits 
into the model of deliberative solution generation. The straight-forward answer to such a 
question would be that it does not help in the process of deliberative solution generation, as 
under aggregation candidates‟ choices are put together or marked with the aim of finding the 
most favourable of the solutions proposed. Upon close analysis of the Msunduzi policy 
document one would discover that some of the objectives of the municipality are customer 
impact and community satisfaction (2005: 02). This is a form of aggregative decision-making, 
simply adding up the views of citizens without reflecting on them collectively. By design, 
77 
 
izimbizo should not operate like aggregative forums, since the policy document states that the 
community shall be involved “in determining their own needs and priorities” (2005: 02). In 
practice, politicians simply arrive with a list of decisions already made on behalf of the 
community. This means this aggregative arrangement to decision-making may be used regularly 
rather than occasionally. The best way to prevent this from happening therefore is that more 
power should be given to the local action units and this should be stipulated in the policy 
document itself. 
Strategic bargaining and negotiation 
Under this decision-making process, “unlike in purely deliberative interactions, parties typically 
do so through the use of threats, differential power, misrepresentation and strategic talk” (Fung 
and Wright, 2003: 19). Clearly this is not the kind of participation Msunduzi Municipality wants 
to see in their institutions, even though the policy document remains silent concerning this. 
Unless the policy document explicitly forbids this kind of participation it remains a threat in the 
proceedings of izimbizo meetings. Strategic negotiation and disputes between political parties is 
not something that is unheard of, in fact in certain types of engagements it is the order of the day. 
The primary point, though, is that izimbizo are not really bargaining forums – there is usually no 
debate – just an exchange of information. 
On the design properties of izimbizo 
Devolution 
The design of izimbizo does not meet the design property requirement of devolution and this 
comes through quite vividly in the policy document itself.  All the concept of devolution wants 
to see in the institutional arrangement of participatory governance or experiment “is the 
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reorganization of power to local action units” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 20).  All that these local 
action units (izimbizo organized by the community) are required to do is that “they need to be 
charged with devising and implementing solutions and held accountable to performance criteria” 
(Fung and Wright, 2003: 20). The current arrangement of izimbizo seems to be far from meeting 
this institutional design property of empowered participatory governance.  
A few factors need to be mentioned if we are to correctly measure devolution in izimbizo. First 
of all izimbizo do not seem to constitute an institutional arrangement of local action units. 
Izimbizo are usually called by politicians in order to consult with communities (MMCPP, 2005: 
04). According to Arnstein (2005: 05), “mere consultation with the community amounts only to 
tokenism” and this is not the kind of participation aimed at empowering citizens, as envisaged in 
the EPG model, or even in the municipal structures Act. Unlike in the ward committees, where 
the community enters into a partnership with the municipality, izimbizo are different to this. 
With izimbizo the politicians have full control over what takes place in the meetings. In fact, 
izimbizo barely meet the most basic criteria of what constitutes an institution. An institution has 
to be stable and regular in its formats, something that is not easy to find in izimbizo.        
There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having 
the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process (Arnstein, 2005: 05). This raises the 
very sensitive issue of who really holds power in the calling and administration of izimbizo. It 
has been seen with the ward committees that, although community members constitute the 
significant part of what makes up a ward committee, community members do not share the 
responsibility of running the ward committee alone. Other government officials, such as the 
councillor, the office of the speaker and the area-based municipal management offices are also 
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charged with certain responsibilities directed towards making sure that the committees carry out 
their functions and responsibilities efficiently. The people who attend izimbizo do not have any 
power to affect the outcome of the process.  
Izimbizo do not have the kind of institutional arrangement that is seen in the ward committees. 
Thus we can expect to see a power differential between the municipal officials and the general 
public or community. This difference in power favours the municipal officials, because they are 
the ones charged with the responsibility of calling and addressing these meetings. Therefore, to 
concur with Arnstein (2005: 05), it seems to me from the analysis of the policy document on 
community participation that participation in izimbizo seems to be an empty ritual and that 
people do not have the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process. Izimbizo remain a 
highly centralized institutional arrangement in all their facets, including political, administrative 
and financial aspects. The real devolution of power remains the challenge of izimbizo. 
Centralized supervision and co-ordination  
The policy document on community participation has made it clear that supervision and co-
ordination by the government is an important part of its institutions. The policy document has 
discharged various roles and responsibilities to ward councillors. It has also given the office of 
the speaker the role of encouraging councillors to hold regular community meetings. The office 
of the speaker, as well as the councillors, are not the only ones given the responsibility of 
steering community participation. Area-based municipal management offices are also tasked 
with a similar responsibility of making sure that local community efforts, aimed at encouraging 
community participation, are given all the support they need. These offices are encouraged to use 
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a participatory approach whenever they plan community-based projects and when they initiate 
any development projects. 
When one analyses the ward committees it is clear how these institutional mechanisms are aimed 
at giving support to participatory institutions. However, there seems to be a problem with the 
design of izimbizo, in that they are more centralized experiments. The fact that izimbizo are a 
prerogative of the politicians puts them out of reach for most community members as an 
institution that they can use effectively in their favour. What creates this obstacle is the fact that 
they are not in charge of the agenda and they do not have any control over the outcome of the 
meetings. The power to set an agenda is a very important form of power distribution, as without 
the power to control and direct discussion in your favour it becomes harder to guide the outcome 
to your advantage.  
In a nutshell, as far as the supervision and co-ordination of izimbizo as an institutional property 
feature, it is safe to conclude that, by nature, they are devoid of any supervision or co-ordination. 
What makes this failure even worse is the fact that these izimbizo are organized and discharged 
by the council/Municipality instead of the community. This makes it difficult to classify these 
meetings as requiring the design properties of supervision and co-ordination, as they are not; in 
essence, community projects centred on the principle of participation, but are the sole initiative 
of the politicians in charge.  
State-centered, not voluntaristic 
Under the EPG model, participatory institutions need to be centred on the state, as part of the 
necessary requirement of the state‟s transformation. To be state-centred simply means that these 
institutions, as opposed to simply being popular inventions that agitate in favour of 
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transformation from outside the state, are meant to become part of the state and attempt to 
transform state-society relations from within. Needless to say, state centred institutions are not 
voluntaristic. This means that the government itself needs to take action to ensure that these 
institutions exist. In other words, the state needs to take the initiative for the creation and 
maintenance of these institutions, as is the case in Porto Alegre‟s Participatory Budget (PB).  
Izimbizo clearly fit the prerequisites of state-centred institutions, as they are not voluntary by 
nature and do not rely on the public for their survival. The community does not need to form a 
group and make a resolution amongst themselves to make sure that izimbizo are called. 
Automatically, it is the function of the government to call izimbizo for the purpose of keeping 
the public aware of its activities or to obtain the community‟s feedback. Again, as outlined in the 
policy document of the Municipality, the government needs to invite people to izimbizo as a 
normal practice of doing needs analysis for the purposes of development, as well as giving 
feedback to the community. 
There seem to be contradictions when it comes to the state-centeredness of izimbizo. The policy 
document does not explicitly state when izimbizo shall be called or held.  It is important to note 
this for the purpose of making sure that izimbizo are not voluntaristic. If izimbizo are held 
whenever it suits the politicians it will mean that they are voluntaristic which, in reality, may 
mean that they escape being controlled by the citizens. Furthermore, this means that if there are 
no clear guidelines as to when exactly these meetings are to be held, there will be a danger that 
they might not be held. If it is not specified what would be the normal issues up for discussion at 




Let us take the example of Porto Alegre, where the community holds at least one imbizo a year, 
at an elective meeting, to discuss the budget as community members. This experiment in Porto 
Alegre shows how participatory trials need to be state-centred, as there must be a specific date 
that is known to everyone when a public meeting is to be held. Given this flexibility  concerning 
the issue of izimbizo, and with them being state-centered, it could be concluded that these are 
voluntaristic, in that government officials can decide when, and when not, to have these 
meetings. All this depends on whether or not those charged with this responsibility are willing to 
co-orperate and whether or not political necessity exists. It can be said that the politics around 
the institution of izimbizo undermines it being state-centred.   
Enabling conditions 
Izimbizo do not seem to be favourable to deliberations, as envisaged by the EPG model. 
Izimbizo need to be able to foster an environment that is conducive to deliberations to take place 
and also to ensure the effectiveness of the meetings. However, izimbizo fail to pass the 
elementary test of ensuring that conducive conditions exist within its processes. The policy 
document does mention the fact that different municipal structures, such as the office of the 
speaker and area-based municipal management offices, will have to assist in making community 
participation possible. It does not explicitly say how exactly these structures are to manage 
izimbizo. Factors such as not knowing the agenda prior to the imbizo influence the effectiveness 
and quality of izimbizo. In cases where they are aware, they are often not involved in the 
drafting of the agenda. What would make a difference in creating conducive conditions, for 
example, would be making sure that stakeholders, in this case the community members, are 
aware of the agenda in advance and perhaps some of their opinions are considered before the 
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outcome is finalized. This remains an ideal, however, since there are many political motives 
behind the calling of izimbizo, other than to advance community participation.        
Partial conclusion  
The institution of imbizo seems to be characterized by a number of design challenges to 
constitute any meaningful institution for participatory governance. Izimbizo differ considerably 
from ward committees in many respects. Firstly, izimbizo lack any parameters of a proper 
institution. Izimbizo simply put forward the desires of the politicians who use them whenever 
they deem fit. These meetings do not have a particular functional structure, such as a date when 
they are held and for how long. The fact that izimbizo lack institutional character means that, 
they are outside any form of supervision and co-ordination except, of course, when they happen 
to be called. In this regard the council can demand to know how a particular imbizo went. Even 
this is not mentioned in the policy document. If asked whether izimbizo can advance a basic 
form of participatory democracy, the answer is an emphatic “yes”. This is because the izimbizo 
have the ability to bring as many people closer to government as possible. This is a benefit of 
this mechanism. The challenges that remain to be addressed are those of building this public-
participatory mechanism into a public-deliberative body, with distinct institutions run by the 







Summary, recommendations and conclusion 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Five, the questions raised in Chapter One will be considered. These include whether 
or not the suggestion that the Msunduzi institutions for participation are poorly designed is true 
or false. How should we arrive at this conclusion? How can these institutions be improved so 
that they lead to much better participation by citizens? The model that we have used to deal with 
this issue is the EPG model.  We have looked at how this model applies to two cases, the ward 
committees and the izimbizo. The examination of case by case reveals factors that exist at the 
policy level about the way these institutions have been designed. There is ample evidence of how 
these institutions have been implemented at the bottom level, so considerations as to the effects 
of design have been made for that level as well. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the problem 
is not only at one level, but is at higher and lower levels of the institution and is effectively 
proven by the findings. This analysis incorporates the policy, as well the practical levels of the 
problem. However, the findings of this thesis do not only indicate the negative nature of these 
institutions, but rather a broader consideration of strengths and weaknesses. In a nutshell, the 
findings of this thesis are that the policy document fails to conform to the design features 
highlighted by the EPG model, which is an effective tool that allows us to properly examine the 





Summary and recommendations 
The ward committee system design: strengths and weaknesses 
Ward committees comply, to a large extent, with the principle design features but are very weak 
on the details. For example, the policy document spelt out the specific issues on which ward 
committees can focus, e.g. community safety or health issues, but what issue the ward committee 
decides to focus on remains with the actual ward committee. The potential danger with this is 
that some ward committees may be tempted to take on more responsibility than they can handle. 
This issue becomes even more likely to occur because ward committees can choose how to use 
subcommittees. Some committees, without due deliberation on the possible constraints of 
implementation, may choose to embark on a number of programmes using subcommittees. This 
is said to be happening in Imbali, for example. Perhaps ward committees can be mandated to 
focus on fewer issues, until they have grown sufficient strength to accept more issues.  The fact 
that it has been specified in the policy that communities affected should be allowed to constitute 
ward committees, makes the principle design feature of bottom-up participation stronger on ward 
committees. The policy fails to specify, for example, the need to accommodate minorities such 
as foreigners, women and any substantially and previously marginalized people from 
government. A variation of interests in the ward committees is likely to increase participation in 
these committees. Community deliberations that are led from below should be made a rule rather 
an exception. This makes the design feature of the ward committees not only appropriate but also 
stronger. The danger, however, remains that if a councillor is mandated to chair the committee, 
wide interest in participating in these committees may be stifled. When the power of the 
committee lies outside the ward councillor this is likely to heighten participation, especially from 
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participants who hold a different point of view from the councillor. The growth of single parties, 
for example, the ANC in most historically black areas and the DA, in most historically white 
areas, may give rise to an uneven political terrain, which promotes the “tyranny of the majority” 
or what has been referred to recently as “the dominant party syndrome”. This may have negative 
effects on the deliberations of the committees. In fact, proper deliberative procedures on the 
committees remain one primary weakness of the principle design feature of the ward committees, 
as they have not been properly spelt out. This poses some danger to the effectiveness of the 
committees. The political environment in some ward committees remains very volatile and 
spelling out deliberative procedures for committees may help level the playing fields.  
The property design features of the ward committees still remain to be strengthened, as these 
features have inherent inner weaknesses. The policy document has given ward committees a 
weaker role to play in the functions of the municipality. Ward committees have been kept on the 
periphery of decision-making in the municipality. The fact that ward committees can only take 
part in the wide-council deliberations, when they have been invited to do so, is a major weakness 
on the part of promoting participation and the possibility of effecting a wide-reaching spectrum 
of democracy to ordinary citizens. Much power needs to be devolved to the wider community 
through ward committees. If democracy is to be effectively deepened, it should be moved away 
from the characterization of power as the sole prerogative of the democratically elected 
representatives. The community should be involved to the best of their ability.  Another possible 
net effect of this is a potential spin-off of expediting implementation of programmes. When 
service delivery happens faster, the dissidents of government may turn to key supporters of it and 
thus strengthening institutions of governance even further.  
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Recombination of the wards has some particular strengths and is provided for at the policy level. 
However, there are a few weaknesses that seem to distort the details of the design of this 
provision. The office of the speaker has the responsibility of ensuring that ward committees 
function properly. If problems arise it should devise strategies for solving them. It may discuss, 
for example, some, or all, of the issues with the council before it takes any major decisions. This 
office should monitor the progress and development of ward committees on a one-on-one basis. 
This is also important in order to ensure that the development of the ward committee system is 
adequately supported in financial terms. The role of councillors in ensuring that ward committees 
are successful has been adequately outlined in the policy document and the debate concerning 
them is believed to have come to completion. Piper and Deacon stress that successful ward 
committees need good ward councillors (2006: 24). However, it needs to be clarified what it is 
that ward councillors need to be good at. Does being a good councillor refer to one‟s ability to 
promote a selfless requirement of the community rather than one of their own? Councillors could 
use this platform to facilitate debate within the ward committees and provide them with useful 
and adequate information. There is also an issue of introducing into ward committee forums a 
concept that aims to create a platform for ward committees to engage in discussions on common 
issues to facilitate a transfer of knowledge from one committee to the other.  
The fact that the institution of ward committees has been established by the government is their 
fundamental strength and is an indication of a government responsive to the needs of its 
community. The democratization of government and the widening of its institutions, needs to be 
led from within government and not from outside. Communities need to have easy access to a 
responsive government that cares about the people. While ward committees remain on the 
periphery of government decision-making, integrating them into the council will help ward off 
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the perception that transformation is impossible without civil society getting involved. In fact, 
even civil society can play the role of supplementing accountability and democracy through ward 
committees. They need not necessarily replace one another. In addition to the input of resources 
input critically needed for the function of the ward committees, the role of area-based municipal 
management offices needs to be revised, in order to cater for the provision of the needs of the 
institutional support ward committees. 
The imbizo system design: strengths and weaknesses 
Having realized many weaknesses in the design of ward committees, the present author finds that 
the imbizo system lags behind, by a considerable margin, in meeting the set standards in their 
principle features, as well as in their property design. The imbizo system seems to be weak in all 
respects. It lacks the critical design principle of practical focus. This system seems to not have a 
practical orientation, in that it aims to solve concrete community problems such as HIV/AIDS, 
crime, environmental issues, housing problems and electricity. If the use of izimbizo is to meet 
the critical requirement of empowered participatory governance, it needs to respond to real 
problems and to turn away from becoming “talk shops”, as ward committees have been referred 
to. Participation needs to be led from below. This is a move away from the erstwhile model of 
participation, which is essentially top-down. A top-down model is normally the tool of 
politicians for engaging the community for reasons that may be contrary to that of community 
sentiment. The system seems to be more of a top-down approach than a bottom-up approach to 
participation. Another weakness to the design of this system is that it lacks any detailed layout of 
deliberative procedures. It is necessary to explain procedures of deliberation, especially in a 
society characterized by political intolerance. 
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Izimbizo also lack critical design properties to help them constitute an example of empowered 
participatory experiment.  The system remains weak in relation to the property design of 
devolution. This is evident in the fact that the people who constitute these meetings do not have 
any power in relation to the meetings and do not have the power to make decisions. The policy 
needs to do more to change the perceptions about where power really lies, when it comes to 
leading community participation. The biggest challenge is to make it clear that power rests with 
the community themselves and not with the politicians or officials. There is no more important 
factor in empowered participatory governance than ensuring that the agenda belongs to the 
community. If the people do not set the agenda, how can they ensure that these meetings provide 
benefits to the community to which they are intended? The imbizo system needs to belong to the 
community rather than to politicians. This will ensure greater accountability as the community 
increasingly becomes aware of issues in the municipality. The issues could include anything 
from constraints to service delivery to opportunities that could be utilized for the good of the 
community. Supervision of the imbizo system is almost not a concern for them, because they do 
not constitute elements of an institution that would allow them to be supervised. Therefore 
supervision of izimbizo is not yet a matter to be worried about. The imbizo system needs to be 
reorganized to allow it to be in the hands of the community and only then will the state be able to 
adequately supervise the function and input of izimbizo.  
Another important consideration is the question of how state-centred the imbizo system is.  The 
current way in which the decision to call an imbizo lies with the politician leaves much to be 
desired. The way the imbizo system currently operates is counter-productive to the aim of 
turning these meetings into a successful participatory experiment. The threat is exacerbated by 
the fact that politicians have turned them into an electioneering mechanism, often accompanied 
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by free food and entertainment. This is not to say that this happens all the time. It is, however, an 
indication of how this participatory mechanism can be manipulated when it is not in the hands of 
the community itself. When these participatory experiments of izimbizo have been accompanied 
by food parcels, the question is raised whether or not municipalities can afford this largesse, 
especially when most of them do not have a budget for it? However, when these meetings lie in 
the hands of the community, the community is in a much better position to decide when and how 
izimbizo should be carried out, without the usual pressure to supply food and entertainment. On 
the other hand, it is incontrovertible that the availability of food during izimbizo, when used for 
the right reasons could constitute a certain form of citizen empowerment that could lead to 
citizens being better-abled and positioned to solve their own problems.                   
Overview of participatory democracy for wider national transformation 
Something needs to be said about the environment in which the participatory institutions have 
been founded. These municipal participatory institutions seem to have been placed in an 
environment that is unreceptive to the goals of transformation, due to a history which advocated 
the disempowerment and disenfranchisement of the community at large. In spite of this, it seems 
as if these measures, regardless of their actual success, signal a clear intention by the current 
government to involve the public in functions and decision-making that were previously the sole 
domain of the state. The current Msunduzi community participation policies seem to be 
grounded on the higher principles of the constitution, with sound aspirations of achieving a 
deeper culture of democracy through the systems of ward committees and izimbizo. This is 
ultimately the strength of the policy document. The range of legislations, from the Municipal 
Structures Act to the Municipal Systems Act, serve as an indication of determination by the 
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national government to replace old institutions with an essential element of democracy. The last 
chapters of the present study show us clearly that, according to the standards of the one-key 
model, there remains much to be done to enhance participatory governance in South Africa. By 
looking at this design the general statement can be made about how in South Africa people can 
realize their ambitions of having participatory institutions that work better by cultivating the 
culture of debate.  By using the tools provided by such model citizens can be empowered to 
realize these goals.   
Recombination of imbizo-ward committee institutions: towards a holistic approach to 
participation  
Another question is how the two institutions of participatory governance, the ward committees 
and izimbizo, can be combined to constitute one coherent system. This recombination can be 
referred to as a holistic approach, in that the two participatory systems become mutually 
inclusive rather than exclusive. Practically, when applied to the Msunduzi Municipality, it means 
that, while ward committees meet regularly to discuss more local issues, there can be one or two 
izimbizo in a year where perhaps three wards can call the government to come to the community 
and deliver a government plan. At another imbizo the government account to the community 
about how far it managed to execute some of the mandated responsibilities. Ward committees 
could have a ward committees forum, to discuss common problems. But the whole idea behind 
the recombination is to make more meaningful community participation that leads to more ideas 
being conveyed to government officials. This will lead to a mutual understanding between the 
government and the communities concerning challenges and obstacles to development. Finally, 
more thought should be put into how these two institutions can be linked, in order to make them 
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one, and how to pour more resources into the institution to make participation work. This will 
not be difficult for the Msunduzi Municipality, because it is well-endowed with resources when 
compared with other municipalities.  
Conclusion 
While participation is a goal, Piper and Nadvi (2007: 47) caution that “Enhancing public 
participation requires a change of attitude amongst both officials and politicians, on the one 
hand, and citizens and civil society on the other.”  When too much power is placed in the hands 
of the council the purpose of the document appears to be to legitimize government actions and 
decisions, rather than to allow the community to have an effective role, or share, in the way the 
government is run. The role of participatory institutions should be that of allowing the 
community to share in the running of the government, by being allowed to have a say in what 
needs to happen. In this case, the role of the government would be to look at the wishes and 
decisions of the community and to act on them and to advice on the availability of resources. 
This new arrangement will help change the rules of the game away from where the government 
“consults” the community in order to legitimize government programmes.  Under the new rules, 
the government would deliver what the community wants and the executive council would alter 
its perceptions about the involvement of the communities in the affairs of the municipality. The 
perception would change that the only interest of the community is to challenge the powers of 
the representatives rather than to supplement them. The role of the community should effectively 
be that of sharing ideas concerning how best to solve the problems of the community which have 






THE MSUNDUZI MUNICIPALITY 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION POLICY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Systems Act (Chapter 6), for the first time, gives communities the legal right to information, 
consultation and participation on local governmental matters and gives municipalities legal 
responsibilities in relation to participation. 
Community development tells us that communities with high level of community participation are safer, 
more democratic, more attractive to investment, and have a low incidences of crime and homelessness. 
When people participate in collective action they receive a positive benefit for themselves, generate trust 
in the services institutions they participate in. This increases the effectiveness of these services and 
institutions and creates even higher levels of trust that can generate even broader societal benefits. 
Community Participation is the direct or indirect involvement and education of people, through 
democratically elected representative in all projects that affect their daily lives. It also enables the 
establishment of partnerships with the stakeholders that could make a contribution to the implementation 
of the identified projects and/ or programmes. 
It is a concept that provides opportunities for people wanting to partake in decision making process in 
order to enhance the overall outcome.   
The Msunduzi Municipality has always been committed to participation by communities because we 
believe it leads to: 
 
  better service delivery 
  more effective decision making  
  priorities setting by staff and committees. 
  increase community satisfaction 
  enhance community development 
 greater accountability 
 
The Msunduzi Municipality is committed to community participation. This commitment will also help us 
in fulfilling the following legislations and principles: 
The Constitution of South Africa 
The objects of local Government are contained in the constitution Chapter 7, Section 152 sub-section1: 
- To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities. 
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- To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. 
- To promote social and economic development. 
- To encourage the involvement of communities and communities organizations in the matters of 
Local Government. 
The Municipal Systems Act (Chapter 6): 
Encourages community involvement/participation.  The Act states that in order for Communities to 
participate in the decision making process of the municipality there needs to be encouragement and the 
conditions conducive for communities to participate in the affairs of Local Government. 
The Municipal Structures Act chapter 4,  
encourages municipalities to form ward committees for the purposes of increasing community 
participation. 
Batho Pele Principles 
 Consultation 




 Openness and Transparency 
 Dealing with complaints 
Giving Best Value 
Encouraging Innovation and Reward Excellence 
Customer Impact 
THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION:                
       
 To promote the necessity of a tripartite alliance amongst the communities, politicians and 
officials of the Msunduzi Municipality in local governance. 
 To directly involve communities throughout the municipality, with special emphasis on those 
who have previously been marginalized, in determining their own needs and priorities. 
 To give communities the opportunity to exercise real control over all stages of a programme that 
affects them with a view of creating a sense of ownership and thus promoting their civil 
responsibility. 
 To improve project efficiency by promoting cooperation and interaction among beneficiaries and 






To establish a community participation approach/ system that would lead to self- mobilization of 
communities whereby they will be facilitated to participate in joint analyses with council and all relevant 
stakeholders to improve their living and working conditions. 
CUSTOMERS AND DEMARCATIONS OF THE MSUNDUZI MUNICIPALITY 
The customers of the City are: 
⁭         The business community 
⁭         Formal/urban areas 
⁭         Informal settlements 
⁭         The District Municipality, Government Ministries and Parastatal Organisations 
⁭         Visitors and Tourists 
 
To effectively address the needs of the customers, the municipality is divided into geographically 5 
defined areas of relative socio-economic and developmental homogeneity. 




Central and Eastern Areas 
Northern Areas 
 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION STRUCTURES 
 Ward Committees 
 
The Municipal Structures Act (Chapter 4) encourages ward committees formation in-order to enhance 
participatory democracy in Local Government.  The communities should participate in their wards 
through ward committees. The chairperson of the ward committee according to The Municipal Structures 
Act should be the ward councillor. The chairperson should convene and chair meetings. 
Ward committees should organize communities into small sub-committees that will deal with different 
issues like health, crime, education etc. These sub-committees will encourage people to participate in 





Izimbizo should be called by the municipality in order to consult with the communities. These meetings 
should be held in the community halls, churches, sports-grounds or open-fields. Izimbizo are big 
community meetings which are usually called by the politicians e.g mayors and members of parliament 
and amakhosi. Izimbizo are used to do report back or to get the community needs. 
 Community meetings.  
These meetings should be called by the ward councilors to discuss community or ward issues. They are 
different from izimbizo. 
THE ROLE OF AREA BASED MANAGEMENT WITH REGARD TO COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION  
 Will use Community based Planning methodology in accessing specific needs and priorities of 
exclusive community/sector by so doing encourage community participation. 
 Assist the communities/ward committees and stakeholders providing the necessary information to 
encourage participation 
 Facilitate community participation in joint analyses with the municipality and other stakeholders 
to improve their living conditions. 
 
KEY ROLE OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS WITH REGARD TO COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION 
A Councillor will 
 hold regularly ward committee meetings. 
 have regular periodic community meetings to ensure a platform for obtaining inputs from the 
community and to give feedback to the community-special meetings. 
 Encourage community members to attend any municipal meetings. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKERS OFFICE WITH REGARD TO COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION 
The speaker’s office: 
 will encourage the councillors to hold ward committee meetings regularly. 
 should encourage councillors to have regular periodic community meetings to ensure a platform 
for obtaining inputs from the community and to give feedback to the community-special 
meetings.  
 will facilitate access to communities 
 
 
COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION 




The municipality will communicate its commitment to community participation policy and processes to 
communities. 
 
The municipality will provide adequate communication/education to all community groups in order to 
increase community participation. 
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT 
The Msunduzi Municipality will continually seek opportunities to improve understanding of and 
adherence to the community participation policy. All elements of this policy will be reviewed regularly to 
ensure that the municipality is operating in line with best practice in public participation. The 
management committee (MANCO) will review the policy and any amendments required will be 
submitted to the Executive Committee for approval. 
SANCTIONS 
Deliberate breach of circumvention of the principles of this policy, or of the guidelines and procedures 
that implement it, will lead to the appropriate disciplinary action. 
 
…………………………………. 
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